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BETWEEN LEGITIMACY AND CONTROL: CHALLENGES 
AND RECUSALS OF JUDGES AND ARBITRATORS IN 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 
CHIARA GIORGETTI* 
INTRODUCTION 
International courts and tribunals play an increasingly funda-
mental role in the maintenance of peace and stability, economic 
development, and the protection of human dignity. 1 Indeed, the 
cases they hear and resolve originate and touch upon diverse 
spheres such as boundary disputes, the use of force, the regulation 
of trade and investment, and violations of human rights.2 With 
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1. See generally KJ. Keith, Resolving International Disputes: The Role of Courts, 7 N.Z. 
YEARBOOK INT'L L. 255, 260 (2009) (explaining the roles of international courts and the 
States' use of them); Karen J. Alter, The Multiple Roles of International Courts and Tribunals: 
Enforcement, Dispute Settlement, Constitutional and Administrative Review, in INTERDISCIPLINARY 
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAw AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 345 Qeffrey L. Dunoff 
& Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013) (explaining the duel role of international courts as protect-
ing and challenging state sovereignty, as the courts gain responsibility and are used more 
frequently). 
2. For a succinct yet comprehensive overview of the work of the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ), see generally Sean Murphy, The International Court of justice, in THE RuLES, 
PRA=ICE, AND JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 11 (Chiara 
Giorgetti ed., 2012); Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal 
Based Approach, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 225, 225-27 (2012) (analyzing the range of interna-
tional courts and their effectiveness in achieving goals). 
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increased visibility and relevance, however, comes increased 
scrutiny.3 
More and more, these now plentiful international courts are 
seen as effective agents of change, a feature that inevitably carries 
many responsibilities. 4 Indeed, observers have focused on issues of 
legitimacy, effectiveness, and performance of the dozens of inter-
national courts and tribunals that are available to the international 
community.5 
Some have said that the international dispute resolution system, 
and in particular investor-state arbitration, suffers "a legitimacy cri-
sis," and have called for changes in the system.6 Others have 
framed their demands for legitimacy for international courts and 
tribunals within the larger discourse of the legitimacy of interna-
tional organizations.7 Scrutiny has highlighted concerns related to 
the procedures applied to select8 and remove judges and arbitra-
3. See generally Cesare Romano, Karen J. Alter & Yuval Shany, Mapping International 
Adjudicative Bodies, the Issues and Players, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
ADJUDICATION 3 (Cesare Romano, Karen J. Alter, & Yuval Shany eds., 2013) [hereinafter 
OXFORD HANDBOOK] (examining legitimacy, effectiveness, quality, and systemic concerns 
raised about international courts). 
4. See, e.g., Allen Buchanan & Robert 0. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance 
Institutions, 20 ETHICS & INT'L AFFAIRS 405 (2006) (recognizing the importance and evolv-
ing nature of international courts and other institutions). 
5. See, e.g., Faculty of Law, PluriCourts- Centre for the Study of the Legitimate Roles of the 
judiciary in the Global Order, UNIV. OsLo, http://wwwJus.uio.no/pluricourts/english/ 
[https:/ /perma.cc/5GLN-RTJE] (a center of excellence created by the Norwegian govern-
ment that contains research into the legitimacy concerns and efficiency models for interna-
tional courts and tribunals) (last visited Oct. 22, 2016); The Danish Research Foundation's 
Center of Excellence for International Courts, iCourts, UNIV. COPENHAGEN, http:/ I 
jura.ku.dk/icourts/ [https:/ /perma.cc/GW2G-FNUC] (contains research into the legiti-
macy, causes and effects, and evolution of international legal bodies) (last visited Oct. 22, 
2016). 
6. Charles N. Brower & Sandie Blanchard, What Is a Meme? The Truth About Interna-
tional Investor-State Arbitration: Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed By States, 25 
CoLUM. J. TRAN'L L. 689, 761-77 (2014); see Amokura Kawhura, Participation of Non-govern-
ment Organizations in Investment Arbitration as Amici Curiae, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVEST-
MENT ARBITRATION 275, 283-88 (Michael Waibel, Asha Kaushal, Kyo-Hwa Chung & Claire 
Balchin eds., 2010); Susan Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Priva-
tizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1521, 1556, 
1584-1610 (2005); Susan Franck, The ICSID Effect?: Considering Potential Variations in Arbitra-
tion Awards, 51 VA.J. INT'L L. 825, 914 (2011). 
7. See, e.g., KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEw TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW - CouRTS, 
POLITICS AND RIGHTS (2014) (exploring the scope and powers of international courts oper-
ating around the world); LEGITIMIZING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Dominik Zaum ed., 
2013) (comparing and evaluating the legitimization practices of specific international and 
regional organizations). 
8. For the author's earlier work on the selection of judges and arbitrators, see Chiara 
Giorgetti, Who Decides Who Decides in International Investment Arbitration?, 35 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 
431 (2014). 
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tors as a fundamental principle of due process that contributes to 
the independence and perceived legitimacy of members of any 
bench or arbitral tribunal.9 
Within this framework, robust and effective challenge proce-
dures for judges and arbitrators become fundamental control 
mechanisms, and are important to guarantee the legitimacy of 
international courts and tribunals. 10 Indeed, proper challenge 
procedures ensure the independence of judges and arbitrators at 
all stages of the procedures. They also allow parties an essential 
opportunity to raise concerns about any of the decision-makers in 
their case. 11 
Yet, challenges of judges and arbitrators in international courts 
and tribunals is a vastly understudied subject. 12 To correct this 
imbalance, this Article makes three novel contributions. First, and 
for the first time, it details and compares challenge procedures 
across a variety of international courts and tribunals, including 
both permanent and ad hoc institutions. Second, it provides 
unique data on challenges and provides a detailed analysis of their 
outcomes. Third, it makes two concrete recommendations that 
should be adopted as baseline requirements to improve and har-
monize existing challenge procedures: (1) it proposes that an 
external or semi-external institution take decisions on challenges, 
9. Mackenzie and Sands, pioneers iµ the systematic study of international courts and 
tribunals, assert that 'judicial independence is recognized to be a significant factor in 
maintaining the credibility and legitimacy of international courts and tribunals." Ruth 
Mackenzie & Phillippe Sands, International Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the 
International Judge, 44 HARV. J. lNT'L. L. 271, 271 (2003). 
10. See Rudiger Wolfrum, Legitimacy in International Law, MAx PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF Pus. lNT 0 L LAw (Mar. 2011), http:/ /opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/ 
9780199231690 /law-978019923169()..e l 960?rskey=wsTGyM&result=l &prd=EPIL [https:/ / 
perma.cc/P38Z-8SVG] (exploring the concept of legitimacy in international law). 
11. On the debate between independence and effectiveness of international courts, 
see Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CALIF. L. 
REv. 1 (2005) (arguing the no such correlation exists). See Laurence H. Helfer & Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and 
Yoo, 93 CALIF. L. REv. 899, 902, 955 (2005) (responding to Posner and Yoo and arguing 
that the most effective courts are the most independent ones); Yuval Shany, Judicial Inde-
pendence as an Indicator of International Court Effectiveness: A Goal-Based Approach, in THE Cur.,. 
TURE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES 
251, 253 (Shimon Shetreet & Christopher Forsyth eds., 2012) (suggesting a new, goal-
oriented approach to assess international judicial effectiveness). 
12. See Karin Oellers-Frahm, International Courts and Tribunals, judges and Arbitrators, 
MAx PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF Pus. lNT 0L LAw 'l[ 20 (2013) ("[T]he topic [of recusals] 
needs more attention with the increasing number of international judges, which will prob-
ably lead to an increase in critical situations."). 
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and (2) it proposes adoption of a common standard of review 
based on a reasonable third party observer. 
The analysis proceeds as follows: Part I first explains why a com-
parative analysis of rules from different courts and tribunals is nec-
essary and warranted, and then examines the diverse provisions 
applicable to challenge procedures in some of the most important 
international courts and tribunals; Part II assesses new empirical 
data relating to the number of challenges and the success rate of 
challenge procedures under some of those rules, and explains 
some of the reasons for those challenges; Part III builds on these 
findings and concludes by suggesting ways to strengthen the chal-
lenge and recusal rules within the existing procedural systems. 
I. CHALLENGING JUDGES AND ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 
Once rare in proceedings of international courts and tribunals, 
recently challenges have become more common.13 Indeed, repeat 
appointments and potential personal, professional, and case or 
issue conflicts result in more reasons for parties to suspect the pos-
sible partiality or lack of independence of an arbitrator or judge.14 
Additionally, tactical or unmeritorious challenges are also on the 
rise, and parties use them to delay proceedings, obtain strategic 
advantages, and minimize possible disadvantages.15 
13. For example, of the challenges filed under the International Convention for Set-
tlement oflnvestment Disputes (ICSID), all but two were filed after 2001. See KAREL DAELE, 
CHALLENGES AND DISQUALIFICATION OF ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 515, 
527 (2012) (table of cases); see also Meg Kinnear & Frauke Nitschke, Disqualification of Arbi-
trators Under the ICSID Convention and Rules, in CHALLENGES AND REcuSALs OF JuDGES AND 
ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRJBUNALS 34, 35 (Chiara Giorgetti ed., 2015); 
infra Table 1. 
14. Luke A. Sabota, Repeat Arbitrator Appointments in International Investment Disputes, in 
CHALLENGES AND REcuSALS OF JUDGES AND ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND 
TRIBUNALS supra note 13, 293-94; Romain Zamour, Issue Conflicts and the Reasonable Expecta-
tion of an Open Mind: The Challenge Decision in Devas v. India and its Impact, in CHALLENGES 
AND REcuSALS OF JUDGES AND ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS supra 
note 13, at 227, 227-28, 243; see, e.g., Burlington Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on the Proposal or Disqualification of Professor Fran-
cisco Orrego Vicuna (Dec. 13, 2013), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-docu-
ments/italaw3028.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/3D3Z-XW8A] (arbitrator challenged because, 
inter alia, he had been nominated by claimant's counsel eight times). · 
15. See Costantine Partasides, The Art of Selecting the Right Arbitrator, THE LONDON ScH. 
OF ECON. & POLITICAL SCIENCE (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.lse.ac.uk/newsAndMedia/video 
AndAudio/ channels/ publicLecturesAndEvents/ player.aspx?id=l 252 [https:/ I perma.cc/ 
K7CT-7P3Ql (arguing that parties can have four reasons to launch a tactical challenge: to 
delay proceedings; send a warning to the challenged arbitrator; drive the arbitrator into 
making a mistake and create a reason to challenge; and push the arbitrator to resign). 
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Naturally, requesting the removal of a judge or an arbitrator 
after their appointment in a specific case is a difficult decision for 
counsel.16 Challenges can create tension between the tribunal and 
the parties, between the parties, and within challenged and unchal-
lenged members of a court or tribunal.17 They can also result in 
heightened scrutiny of other procedures that occur during the pro-
ceeding.18 Even successful challenges sour relations, and all chal-
lenges add time to the proceedings.19 
This Part first explains why a comparative study of rules applica-
ble in different courts and tribunals is warranted and necessary. It 
then compares and assesses the main rules applicable to challenges 
with a specific eye at identifying the different elements that may 
strengthen or undermine the legitimacy of the members of inter-
national courts and tribunals. 
A. Prolegomena: Comparing Rules from Different Courts 
A comparative study on international challenge procedures may 
sound far-fetched. 20 Indeed, international courts and tribunals are 
16. See GONTHER HORVATH & STEPHAN WILSKE, GUERILLA TACTICS IN INTERNATIONAL 
NrnITRATION 8, 15 (2013). 
17. See DAELE, supra note 13, at 103 ("[C]hallenging an arbitrator can be a weapon 
used by parties who wish to sabotage the arbitration . . . . The later the challenge comes in 
the arbitration proceeding, the bigger its potential disruptive effect."). 
18. Sometimes this heightened scrutiny results from the process being reviewed twice. 
As Daele notes, sometimes parties to the arbitration are free to agree to continue the arbi-
tration while the challenge procedure is pending, which is then reviewed when the tribu-
nal is reconstituted. DAELE, supra note 13, at 102. For example, in Salini v. Jordan, the 
parties agreed upon a procedure informally during the challenge process, which was then 
reviewed again after the tribunal was reconstituted. See Salini Costruttori S.p.A. & Ital-
strade S.p.A. v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 'll'I[ 9-10 (Nov.29, 2004), https:/ /icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet? 
requestType=casesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC635_En&caseld=C218 [https:/ I 
perma.cc/EL62-YXCQJ. 
19. DAELE, supra note 13, at 103-05 ("Challenges made at the final stage of the pro-
ceeding are potentially the most disruptive because, if upheld and a new arbitrator has to 
be appointed as successor, parts of the proceeding may have to be repeated."). Daele goes 
on to cite the case of Victor Pey v. Chile, in which Chile challenged the entire tribunal three 
weeks before the tribunal was scheduled to meet. Id. at 105. Two new arbitrators reconsti-
tuted the tribunal, extending the time period of the issuance of the award by more than 
two and a half years. See Victor Pey Casado & President Allende Foundation v. Republic of 
Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/2, Decision on the Application for Annulment of the 
Republic of Chile, 'll 39 (Dec. 18, 2012). 
20. See generally Anthea Roberts, Paul B. Stephan, Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Mila Ver-
steeg, Comparative International Law: Framing The Field, 109 AM. J. INT'L L. 467 (2015) 
(describing the challenge and framing the new field of comparative international law); 
Chiara Giorgetti, Cross-Fertilisation of Procedural Law Among International Courts and Tribunals: 
Methods and Meanings, in PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 
(Arman Sarvarian et al. eds., 2015) (comparing various international courts and tribunals). 
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distinct institutions with specific jurisdictions and rules of proce-
dure. International courts and tribunals may hear disputes 
between states, between individuals and states, or of individual 
criminal acts. 21 They pronounce decisions on very diverse matters, 
including state responsibility, individual criminal responsibility, 
treaty violations, and standard of treatment of foreign investors.22 
However, in the universe of international actors, international 
courts and tribunals remain specific and defined actors that share 
the common function of adjudicating international disputes.23 
International judicial bodies share other important characteristics, 
too.24 First, they are all created by an international legal instru-
ment, such as a treaty, a U.N. Security Council Resolution, or the 
application of a multilateral convention. Second, they apply and 
are regulated by international norms and operate in the interna-
tional legal system, where domestic law is only tangentially relevant, 
if at all. 25 Third, judges and arbitrators themselves are interna-
tional actors and, while exercising their function, must be 
detached from any domestic legal system.26 
Courts and tribunals themselves routinely look at each other's 
decisions on matters of challenges to finalize and strengthen their 
own reasoning on similar matters.27 Thus, for example, in Prosecu-
tor v. Anto Furundiija, the Appeals Chamber of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (IC1Y)-a tribunal 
specially created to hear cases on individual criminal responsibility 
for grave violations of international criminal law in the former 
Yugoslavia-was required to decide issues of judicial impartiality.28 
To do so, the Appeals Chamber reviewed in detail the decisions on 
21. See generally CHIARA GIORGETTI, THE RuLEs, PRACTICE, AND JURISPRUDENCE OF INTER-
NATIONAL CouRTS AND TRIBUNALS (Chiara Giorgetti ed., 2012) (discussing the various juris-
prudence of international courts). 
22. THE MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 1 (Ruth Mackenzie et al. 
eds., 2010). 
23. See generally Chiara Giorgetti, International Adjudicative Bodies, in THE OxFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Jacob Cogan et al. eds., forthcoming 2016). 
24. See Chiara Giorgetti, Introduction, in THE RULES, PRA=IcE, AND JURISPRUDENCE OF 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 1-3 (Chiara Giorgetti ed., 2012). 
25. Id. at 2. 
26. See generally Romano, Alter & Shany, supra note 3, at 6-7 (explaining that a defin-
ing characteristic of international adjudicative bodies is that they are composed of inde-
pendent individuals who do not represent any state). 
27. See generally Giorgetti, supra note 20, at 224 (discussing how various procedures 
and laws are shared across international tribunals). 
28. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17 /l-A99, Judgment, ~ 178 (Int'! Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000), http:/ /www.icty.org/x/cases/furundzija/ 
acjug/ en/fur-aj00072le.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/CPQ3-3GHZ]. 
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the issue by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), an 
international court tasked with deciding cases on asserted viola-
tions of individual human rights by a state in the territory of the 
European Council.29 Specifically, the chamber looked at the inter-
pretation by the ECHR of Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, which provides the right to a fair and public hear-
ing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tri-
bunal established by law. 3o 
The same mechanism occurs in international arbitration. For 
example, in a challenge brought in the context of an inter-state 
litigation between the United Kingdom and Mauritius, the arbitral 
tribunal thought it "advisable" to first compare the law and practice 
of courts and tribunals deciding disputes between states, and then 
look at the law and practice of other international tribunals deal-
ing with cases between non-state parties or between a state and a 
non-state entity.31 In its thorough analysis, the tribunal reviewed 
the rules of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration (PCA), and the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea (ITLOS) .32 
Thus, it is not only proper, but indeed advisable, to compare the 
law and practice among different courts to explore and verify the 
establishment of best practices, since the courts themselves com-
pare and assess their own rules in relation to each other. The fol-
lowing Section does just that. 
B. Rules Applicable to Challenge Procedures 
There are no uniform rules of procedure applicable to all inter-
national judicial proceedings.33 Quite the contrary-each court 
and tribunal has adopted specific rules shaped by the unique needs 
and characteristics of the institution.34 Although these rules are 
certainly informed by other existing international procedural 
29. See Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas, The European Court of Human Rights, in THE 
RULES, PRACTICE, AND JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, supra note 
21, at 362-63. 
30. Prosecutor v. Furund_ija, Case No. IT-95-l 7/l-A99, Judgment, U 181-83. 
31. The Republic of Mauritius v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and North Ireland, 
In the Matter of an Arbitration Before an Arbitration Tribunal Constituted Under Annex 
VII of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Chagos Marine Pro-
tected Area Arbitration), Reasoned Decision on Challenge, ~~ 140-55 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
2011), https:/ /www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/l 792 [https:/ /perma.cc/U3BV-
L3WS]. 
32. Id. 
33. See infra Sections l.B.1-5. 
34. See infra Table 1 (Summary of Challenge Procedures). 
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rules, the differences are sufficiently important to call for a 
detailed institutional analysis. 
The rules of procedures relating to challenges in the main inter-
national courts and tribunals reviewed below include the rules 
applied by the ICJ-the principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations-and those applicable in the context of international 
investment arbitration, including those used in both United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
and International Convention for Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes (ICSID) proceedings. As a useful comparison, the Section 
also reviews the rules applied in international criminal courts and 
tribunals that have witnessed several challenge proceedings. 
1. The International Court of Justice 
The rules and mechanisms to challenge and recuse a judge of 
the International Court of Justice found in the ICJ Statute are 
unique and mirror those found in the statute of the ICJ's predeces-
sor, the Permanent Court of International Justice.35 
Article 2 of the ICJ Statute provides that the court should be 
comprised of independent judges.36 Upon taking office, judges 
make the solemn declaration to perform their duties and exercise 
their powers "impartially and conscientiously."37 Article 16 prohib-
its members from exercising any political or administrative func-
tion or engaging in another professional occupation.38 Article 17 
further establishes certain instances of relative incompatibility and 
mandates judges not to act as "agent, counsel, or advocate in any 
case."39 It also forbids judges from participating in decisions in 
cases in which they have "previously taken part as agent, counsel, 
or advocate ... or as a member of a national or international court, 
... commission of [i]nquiry, or in any other capacity."40 
Should an incompatibility arise, it is for the judges themselves to 
raise it first. 41 Indeed, the ICJ Statute relies initially on the self-
monitoring of each judge, and envisages only a subsidiary control 
35. See generally Statute for the Permanent Court of International Justice art. 24, 1921 
P.C.IJ. 390, http:/ /www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_D/D_Ol_le_edition.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/ 
DT3H-PSKR] (Article 24 provides procedures for recusal). 
36. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 2,June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 
U.N.T.S. 933 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
37. Id. art. 20. 
38. Id. art. 16. 
39. Id. art. 17. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. art. 24. 
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role for the president of the court and ultimately for the court as a 
whole.42 Article 24 of the statute provides that "if, for some special 
reason, a member of the Court considers he or she should not take 
part in the decision of a particular case, he shall so inform the 
President."43 This situation has occurred several times in the his-
tory of the court, especially in the initial period of a judge's tenure, 
as judges tend to have practiced in front of the court or have had 
close interactions with it before their election.44 
Additionally, the president of the ICJ may give notice to a mem-
ber of the court if, "for some special reason," he or she believes 
that the member should not sit in a particular case.45 There is only 
one case in which the president allegedly used this power.46 If the 
member of the court and the president disagree on this, it is the 
court as a whole that settles the issue by a decision of all the 
judges.47 The parties can also initiate requests for disqualifica-
tion. 48 Article 34 of the Rules of the Court provides that any party 
may communicate confidentially in writing to the president any 
facts that the party considers relevant to the application of Articles 
17 and 24 of the ICJ Statute.49 
Requests for removal of a judge are rare.50 Jn.·the history of the 
ICJ only three cases are known: two pertaining to requests for advi-
sory opinions, and only one brought in the context of a conten-
42. Chiara Giorgetti, The Chall,enge and Recusal of judges of the International Court of jus-
tice, in CHALLENGES AND REcuSALS OF JUDGES AND ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
AND TRIBUNALS, supra note 13, at 3, 17. 
43. ICJ Statute, supra note 36, art. 24. 
44. See ROBERT KoLB, THE INTERNATIONAL CouRT OF JusTICE 136 (2013); Giorgetti, 
supra note 42, at 18 (table of cases). 
45. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 24 of the ICJ Statute read as follows: 
2. If the President considers that for some special reason one of the members of 
the Court should not sit in a particular case, he shall give him notice accordingly. 
3. If in any such case the member of the Court and the President disagree, the 
matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court. 
ICJ Statute, supra note 36, arts. 24(2)-(3). 
46. Sir Robert Jennings, Article 24, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CouRT OF 
JusncE: A COMMENTARY 422, n.27 (Andreas Zimmerman et al. eds., 2006). 
47. ICJ Statute, supra note 36, art. 24. 
48. Giorgetti, supra note 42, at 27. 
49. For the composition of the Court for particular cases, see ICJ Statute, supra note 
36, art. 34(2), 2007 I.CJ Acts & Docs. 113. 
50. Giorgetti, supra note 42, 28-30. 
214 The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. [Vol. 49 
tious case.51 The court rejected each of these requests.52 In 
deciding the three challenges, the court adopted a formalistic 
reading of the applicable rules and did not elaborate on what 
would amount to reasons for a successful challenge.53 
The most recent and well-developed request relates to the chal-
lenge of Judge Elaraby.54 In Legal Consequence of the Construction of 
the Wall in the Occupied Pakstinian Territory, the court was asked by 
the U.N. General Assembly to advise on the legality of Israel's con-
struction of a partition wall in the occupied Palestinian territory.55 
During the proceeding, Israel requested that the president of the 
court remove the Egyptian judge, Nabil Elaraby, a former senior 
diplomat for Egypt.56 The ICJ dismissed Israel's claims and con-
cluded that there was no violation of Article 17 (2), as Judge 
Elaraby had not acted as counsel, agent, or advocate in the case 
when he was a diplomat for Egypt, and that comments he made 
before becoming a judge had not expressed an opinion on the 
case.57 
2. Rules of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law 
The procedural rules of UNCITRAL (UNCITRAL Rules) are fre-
quently used in international litigation, in both international 
investment treaty arbitration and other international disputes, 
including the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.58 
Under UNCITRAL Rules, arbitrators may be challenged "if cir-
cumstances exist" that give rise to ''.justifiable doubts" as to the 
51. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 
Advisory Opinion, 1971I.CJ.16, 11 7 (June 21) (finding three judges sitting on the panel 
did not need to be recused, as prior actions and statements made while in their prior 
positions did not preclude their participation in this case); Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.CJ. 
136, 11 8 (July 9), http:/ /www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1533.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
33JU-N5D7] (finding concerns raised by parties were not enough to preclude judge); 
South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa, Liberia v. South Africa), Second Phase, 
Judgment, 1966 I.CJ. 6 (July 18); see also Giorgetti, supra note 42, at 28-30. 
52. Giorgetti, supra note 42, at 28-30. 
53. See id. at 32. 
54. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestin-
ian Territory, Order, 2004 I.CJ. 3, 11 3 (Jan. 30). 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. See Jeremy K Sharpe, Iran-United States Claims Tribuna~ in THE RULES, PRACTICE, 
AND JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, supra note 21, at 557. 
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impartiality or independence of an arbitrator. 59 The rules are 
more generally worded than those of the ICJ and do not indicate 
specific conflicts. 60 The standard of review calls for 'justifiable 
doubts," generally interpreted to mean that a reasonable and 
informed third party would have justifiable doubts as to the impar-
tiality of the challenged arbitrator.61 However, a party can only 
challenge the arbitrator it appointed for reasons the party learned 
after it made the appointment.62 
The combination of the justifiable doubts threshold with the fact 
that the appointing authority makes challenge decisions, provides 
a balanced approach to challenges. Under UNCITRAL Rules, a 
party that intends to challenge an arbitrator must send notice of 
the challenge within fifteen days after it has been notified of the 
appointment of the arbitrator, or within fifteen days after learning 
of the circumstances giving rise to the challenge.63 The notice of 
challenge and its reasons are communicated directly to the other 
party, the arbitrator who is challenged, and to the other arbitra-
tors. 64 If, within fifteen days from the date of the notice, the par-
ties have not agreed on the challenge or the challenged arbitrator 
has not withdrawn, the party making the challenge may further 
59. U.N. Comm'n on Int'! Trade Law, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (<IS revised in 
2010), art. 12 (Apr. 2011) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules], https:/ /www.unci-
tral.org/ pelf/ english/ texts/ arbitration/ arb-rules-revised/ arb-rules-revised-2010-e. pelf 
[https://perma.cc/RA2Y-G9DD] ("1. Any arbitrator may be challenged if circumstances 
exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator's impartiality or independence. 
2. A party may challenge the arbitrator appointed by it only for reasons of which it 
becomes aware after the appointment has been made."). 
60. See id. 
61. For example, the Decision on the Challenge to Mr.J. Christopher Thomas, QC in 
Gallo v. Canada was taken under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Gallo v. Government 
of Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Decision on the Challenge to Mr. J. Christopher Thomas, 
QC,, 1 (Oct. 14, 2009), http:/ /italaw.com/documents/Gallo-Canada-Thomas_Challenge-
Decision.pelf [https:/ /perma.cc/3XLM-PTM2]. In that case, claimant filed a challenge 
after learning that Mr. Thomas' professional situation had changed since his appointment. 
Id. , 12. Specifically, Mr. Thomas had agreed to advise Mexico, a non-disputing party 
under the North American Free Trade Agreement, on legal matters, which could include 
international investment arbitration. Id. , 4. The appointing authority concluded that 
from the point of view of a "reasonable and informed third party" there would be justifia-
ble doubts about Mr. Thomas' impartiality and independence as an arbitrator, and 
directed him to choose whether to continue to advise Mexico or continue to serve as an 
arbitrator. Id. , 36. He resigned a few days after the decision. Elizabeth Whitsitt, Aroitrator 
Forced to Choose in NAFI'A Dispute over Thwarted Canadian Garoage Site, INV. TREATY NEWS 
(Dec. 4, 2009), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2009/12/04/arbitrator-forced-to-choose-in-nafta-
dispute-over-thwarted-canadian-garbage-site/ [https:/ /perma.cc/ 45LV-GJCZ]. 
62. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 59, art. 12(2). 
63. Id. art. 13(1). 
64. Id. art. 13(2). 
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pursue the challenge by seeking, within thirty days from the date of 
the challenge notice, a decision on the challenge from the author-
ity who appointed the arbitrator.65 
An analysis of the available case law shows increasing challenges 
of arbitrators under these rules. However, challenges are seldom 
successful. One example where an arbitrator was successfully 
removed following a challenge is JCS v. Argentina.66 There, the 
respondent challenged a claimant-•appointed arbitrator.67 The 
challenge was upheld after the court concluded that there was a 
sufficiently serious conflict, because the arbitrator was a partner in 
a firm that had concurrent representation in a separate, long-run-
ning case against Argentina.68 Other types of cases that resulted in 
challenges include cases of "double-hatting" (where an arbitrator 
also acted as counsel in related proceedings) and other conflict of 
interest situations.69 
3. Rules of the International Convention for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes 
Most international investment cases are heard under the Inter-
national Convention for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID).7° Challenge procedures under the ICSID rules are 
unique.71 Article 57 of the ICSID Convention provides that a party 
65. Id. art. 13(4). See generally Giorgetti, supra note 8, at 449-54 (discussing the eligi-
bility criteria for international arbitrators and possible arbitrator challenges with some ref-
erence to UNICITRAL rules). 
66. ICS Inspection and Control SeIVices Limited (U.K.) v. Republic of Argentina, 
NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Case No. 2010-9, Decision on Challenge to Arbitrator, at 4 (Perm. Ct. 
Arb. Dec. 17, 2009), http://www.italaw.com/documents/ICSArbitratorChallenge.pdf 
[https:/ /perma.cc/SG4P-85ZS]. 
67. Id. at 2-4. 
68. Id. at 4-5. 
69. See, e.g., Gallo v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Case No. 55798, Decision 
on the Challenge to Mr. J. Christopher Thomas, QC, at 2-4 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Oct. 14, 2009), 
http:/ I www.italaw.com/ documents/ Gallo-Canada-Thomas_ Challenge-Decision_ 002. pdf 
[https:/ /perma.cc/4ZLU-DCBZ] (finding Mr. Thomas must choose between his roles as 
arbitrator in the case and advisor to Mexico); Sarah Grimmer, The Determination of Arbitrator 
Challenges by the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, in CHALLENGES AND 
REcusALS OF JUDGES AND ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, supra 
note 13, at 80. 
70. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: 
Review of Developments in 2015 1, 4, UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2016/2 Qune 2016) 
("About two [-]thirds of last year's [investor-state dispute settlement] cases were filed with 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), either under the 
ICSID Convention [Arbitration] Rules or under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules ... . 
Overall, [sixty-two] per cent of all known cases have been filed under the ICSID .... "). 
71. See generally James Crawford, Challenges to Arbitrators in ICSID Arbitration, in PRACTIS-
ING VIRTUE: INSIDE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 596, 604-06 (2015) (discussing arbitrator 
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may propose the disqualification of an arbitrator "on account of 
any fact indicating a manifest lack of the qualities" required to be 
nominated.72 The qualities are enumerated in Article 14(1) and 
require an arbitrator to be independent and impartial, and to ful-
fill certain nationality rules.73 
In ICSID's practice, the term "manifest" has generally been 
strictly applied to mean "'obvious' or 'evident' and highly proba-
ble, notjust possible."74 For example, in ConocoPhilipps Company et 
al. v. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the tribunal rejected the 
disqualification proposal of an arbitrator and recalled that ICSID 
decisions recognized the above definition of the term "manifest."75 
Indeed, the tribunal imposed a relatively heavy burden on the 
party proposing disqualification: the manifest lack of the required 
requirements and standard of disqualification under ICSID and suggesting that the thresh-
old for a successful challenge in ICSID appears to be higher than alternative regimes); 
Kinnear & Nitschke, supra note 13, at 41-50 (introducing the procedural steps to disqualify 
an arbitrator under ICSID). 
72. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nation-
als of Other States art. 57, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter 
ICSID Convention]. 
73. Article 14(1) of the ICSID Convention states: 
Persons designated to serve on the Panels shall be persons of high moral charac-
ter and recognized competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry or 
finance, who may be relied upon to exercise independent judgment. Compe-
tence in the field of law shall be of particular importance in the case of persons 
on the Panel of Arbitrators. 
Id. art. 14(1). 
74. ConocoPhillips Company et al. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07 /30, Decision on the Proposal to Disqualify L. Yves Fortier, Q.C., Arbitrator, 'll 
56 (Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ 
ita0223.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/232P-LSX3]. 
75. See id. 'll'll 56, 68. Similarly, other ICSID tribunals deciding proposals for the dis-
qualification of members of the arbitral tribunal confirmed that the term "manifest" meant 
"obvious" or "evident," and that such a finding would require "obvious evidence" of a state 
of mind lacking independence or impartiality. For a well-reasoned explanation and sum-
mary, see Compafifa de Aguas de! Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Repub-
lic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97 /3, Decision on the Challenge to the President of the 
Committee, 'll 28 (Oct. 3, 2001) http:/ /www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-docu-
ments/ita0208.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YDE-27TE]. The tribunal concluded the 
following: 
Id. 
[W]e agree with earlier panels which have had to interpret and apply Article 57 
that the mere existence of some professional relationship with a party is not an 
automatic basis for disqualification of an arbitrator or Committee member. All 
the circumstances need to be considered in order to determine whether the rela-
tionship is significant enough to justify entertaining reasonable doubts as to the 
capacity of the arbitrator or member to render a decision freely and 
independently. 
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qualities to sit as an arbitrator had to appear from objective 
evidence.76 
Challenge proposals under ICSID must be filed with the secre-
tary general "promptly" and before the proceedings are declared 
closed. 77 The secretary general then transmits the proposal to the 
members of the tribunal and notifies the other party.78 If the chal-
lenge relates to a sole arbitrator or the majority of the tribunal, the 
file is also transmitted to the chairman of the Administrative Coun-
cil. 79 The challenged arbitrator is then invited to furnish explana-
tions to the tribunal or the chairman. so 
If only one member of the tribunal is challenged, it is for the 
remaining two members of the tribunal to decide the challenge.81 
The remaining members of the tribunal thus promptly consider 
and vote on the proposal.82 In contrast, it is for the chairman of 
the Administrative Tribunal to decide the challenge if the 
challenge pertains to either the sole arbitrator or the majority of 
the tribunal, or if the remaining members are equally divided.83 
The chairman decides on the challenge, using his or her best effort 
to make a decision within thirty days after he or she has received 
the proposal.84 Pending the decision, the proceedings are sus-
pended.85 
The strict threshold required to challenge an arbitrator under 
ICSID and that decisions are considered by the tribunal's remain-
76. ConocoPhillips Company et al. v. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/07 /30, 11 56. 
77. Int'! Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, ICSID Convention, Regulations and 
Rules: Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules), r. 9(1) (2006) 
[hereinafter ICSID Arbitration Rules]. 
78. Id. r. 9(2). 
79. Id. 
80. Id. r. 9(3). 
81. See id. r. 9(4). 
82. Id. Note that the recent ICSID decision to disqualify an arbitrator is only the 
second successful challenge in ICSID proceedings. The challenge was motivated by the 
fact that, inter alia, the arbitrator had been nominated by claimant's counsel eight times. 
Burlington Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision 
on the Proposal or Disqualification of Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuna, 11 21 (Dec. 13, 
2013), http:/ /www.italaw.com/ sites/ default/files/ case-documents/italaw3028.pdf [https:/ 
/perma.cc/T3PW-Q8ZE]. The challenge on this point was rejected, but the challenge was 
subsequently upheld as the ICSID chairman considered that the allegations raised by the 
challenged arbitrators about the ethics of counsel manifestly evidenced an appearance of 
lack of impartiality. Id. 1I1! 75, 78-80. 
83. See ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 77, r. 9(4). 
84. Id. r. 9(5). 
85. Id. r. 9(6). 
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ing members are unique to these tribunals.86 Significantly, ICSID 
tribunals seem recently to have moved from a strict reading of Arti-
cle 57 to a more refined understanding of "manifest" so as to be 
closer to other common challenge rules, including those under 
UNCITRAL.87 
4. The International Criminal Tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda 
The establishment of ad hoc and permanent international crimi-
nal courts and tribunals marked one of the most important devel-
opments of international litigation.88 Within their statutes and 
governing documents, these courts and tribunals included particu-
lar selection and challenge procedures. 89 
The provisions of the IC1Y and the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for Rwanda (ICTR) are similar, but not identical.90 Per Arti-
cle 13 of the IC1Y Statute and Article 12 of the ICTR Statute, 
judges should be "persons of high moral character, impartiality 
86. On this issue, see Noah Rubins & Bernhard Lauterburg, Independence, Impartiality 
and Duty of Disclosure in Investment Arbitration, in INVESTMENT AND COMMERCIAL ARBITRA-
TION-SIMILARITIES AND DIVERGENCES 163 (Christina Knahr et al. eds., 2010), noting the 
following: 
The ICSID's unique system for adjudicating arbitrator challenges raises interest-
ing questions. Are a challenged arbitrator's colleagues on the tribunal likely to 
remove him in light of the personal and professional connections between them? 
It would seem that an arbitral institution ... would have more interest than co-
arbitrators in carefully scrutinizing alleged conflicts of interest, given the systemic 
and reputational risks that such conflicts implicate. 
87. See supra Section I.B.3. See the new trends in recent decisions in Chiara Giorgetti, 
Caratube v. Kazakhstan: For the First Time Two ICSID Arbitrators Uphold Disqualification of Third 
Arbitrator, AM. Soc'v INT'L L. INSIGHTS (Sept. 29, 2014), http:/ /www.asil.org/insights/vol 
ume/18/issue/22/caratube-v-kazakhstan-first-time-two-icsid-arbitrators-uphold [https:/ I 
perma.cc/XF7C-NY3V]. 
88. See Santiago Villalpando, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via & Robert D. Sloane, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in THE RULES, PRAC-
TICE, AND JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, supra note 21, at 233, 
233. 
89. See Makane Mbengue, Challenges of judges in International Criminal Courts and Tribu-
nals, in CHALLENGES AND REcUSALS OF JUDGES AND ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
AND TRIBUNALS, supra note 13, at 183, 184. 
90. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (IC1Y) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) were created by U.N. Security Council 
Resolutions 808 (1993) and 955 (1994), respectively. For a review of the procedures, see 
id. at 189-201. 
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and integrity"91 who solemnly declare they will discharge their 
duties "honourably, faithfully, impartially and conscientiously."92 
Rule 15 of both the IC1Y and ICTR Rules of Procedure details 
the applicable procedure for the disqualification of judges. 93 
Under Rule 15, a judge may not sit and should withdraw from "any 
case in which he has a personal interest or concerning which he 
has or has had any association which might affect his impartial-
ity. "94 Any party can, based on these grounds, apply to the cham-
ber's presiding judge for the disqualification of a judge of that 
chamber from a trial or appeal.95 The presiding judge then con-
fers with the judge in question.96 
Two different authorities at the IC1Y and ICTR decide on judi-
cial disqualification.97 Under IC1Y rules, the presiding judge con-
fers with the challenged judge and then reports to the tribunal's 
president. If necessary, following the report of the presiding judge, 
the president may appoint a panel of three judges from other 
chambers to report to him or her its decision on the merits of the 
application.98 If the decision is upheld, the president assigns 
another judge to sit in the place of the disqualified judge.99 
At the ICTR, if after consultation between the presiding judge 
and the challenged judge, it is necessary to consider the disqualifi-
cation request, the Bureau-composed under Rule 23 of the presi-
dent, the vice-president, and the presid~ng judge of the Trial 
Chambers-decides on the disqualification proposal.100 
Numerous challenges to judges based on the alleged lack of 
independence and impartiality have been brought in front of both 
international criminal tribunals. 101 Notably, the challenge to dis-
qualify Judge Frederik Harhoff was upheld by a chamber of the 
91. S.C. Res. 955, Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. SI 
RES/955, art. 12 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]; S.C. Res. 808, Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. S/25704, art. 13 (1993) 
[hereinafter ICTY Statute]. 
92. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Rules of Pro-
cedure and Evidence, r. 14, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.50 (July 8, 2015). 
93. Id. r. 15; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (!CTR), Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, r. 15, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev.23 (May 15, 2015). 
94. ICTR, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 93, r. 15. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id.; ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 92, r. 15. 
98. ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 92, r. 15. 
99. Id. 
100. ICTR, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 93, rs. 15, 23. 
101. Mbengue, supra note 89, at 184. 
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ICTY.102 In the case of Vojislav Seselj, a Serbian Radical Party 
leader, a majority of the chamber found that Judge Harhoff "had 
demonstrated an unacceptable appearance of bias in fav[o]r of 
conviction" and disqualified him.103 The chamber's decision was 
the result of a defense motion, following the publication of a per-
sonal letter that Judge Harhoff wrote to numerous other judges 
and friends that was then leaked to the public.104 The defense 
argued, and the chamber agreed, that the letter showed the 
judge's bias in the current proceedings.105 
5. The International Criminal Court 
Challenge procedures applicable to the International Criminal 
Court (ICC)-the only permanent, treaty-based international crim-
inal tribunal-follow the footprints of those found in the ICTY and 
ICTR, but are more detailed and include a binding Code of Judi-
cial Ethics.106 
Article 40 of the ICC Statute requires judges to be "independent 
in the performance of their functions." 107 It provides that judges 
102. See id. 
103. Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Judge 
Harhoff disqualified from Seselj case, U.N. Press Release MS/CS/PR1578e (Aug. 29, 
2013), http:/ /www.icty.org/ en/press/judge-harhoff-disqualified-seselj-case [https:/ I 
perma.cc/NE55-R2YA]. The press release goes on to say the following: 
Id. 
The Majority, Judge Liu dissenting, concluded that by "referring to a 'set practice' 
of convicting accused persons without reference to an evaluation of the evidence 
in each individual case[,]" Judge Harhoff had demonstrated an unacceptable 
appearance of bias. The Chamber also noted in this context that no specific ref-
erence to the accused was required to reach the conclusion of an unacceptable 
appearance of bias. The Majority, Judge Liu dissenting, further ruled that the 
appearance of bias could also be perceived in Judge Harhoffs contention that he 
was confronted by a "professional and moral dilemma," which in the view of the 
Majority, was a reference to his difficulty in applying the current jurisprudence of 
the Tribunal. Judge Frederick Harhoff circulated a private letter to [fifty-six] 
people on 6 June 2013. The letter then became publicly available through the 
media and [I]ntemet. In the letter, the Judge critici[z]ed a number of recent 
Appeals Chamber and Trial Chamber Judgments of the Tribunal and claimed 
that the President of the Tribunal was exerting pressure on his colleagues in 
deliberations. 
104. See Marko Milanovic, Breaking: Judge Harloff Disqualified from the Seselj Case, EJIL: 
TALK! (Aug. 28, 2013), http:/ /www.ejiltalk.org/breakingjudge-harhoff-disqualified-from-
the-seselj-case [https:/ /perma.cc/FTA5-7UQS]. 
105. Prosecutor v. Vojislav Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Disqualification of Judge Frederik Harhoff and Report to the Vice-President, 'l!'ll 14-15 
(Int'! Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/ 
seselj/ tdec/ en/130828.pdf [https:/ I perma.cc/E6WY-VFDG]. 
106. International Criminal Court (ICC), Code of Judicial Ethics, ICC-BD/02-01-05 
(Mar. 9, 2005). 
107. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 40(1), July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter ICC Statute]. 
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cannot "engage in ... activit[ies that are] likely to interfere with 
their judicial functions or to affect confidence in their indepen-
dence."108 Article 40 also requires judges "to serve on a full-time 
basis at the seat of the Court" and to "not engage in any other 
occupation of a professional nature."109 Furthermore, Article 41 
provides that "[t]he President may, at the request of a judge, 
excuse that judge from the exercise of a function under th [ e] Stat-
ute," and specifies that "[a] judge shall not participate in any case 
in which his or her impartiality might reasonably be doubted on 
any ground" including, 
inter alia, [if] that judge has previously been involved in any 
capacity in that case before the Court or in a related criminal 
case at the national level involving the person being investigated 
or prosecuted ... or on such other grounds as may be provided 
for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.U0 
The ICC's Rules of Procedure and Evidence are probably the 
most detailed existing binding procedural rules of any interna-
tional forum. rn Rule 34 specifies that in addition to the grounds 
found in Articles 40 and 41, grounds for disqualification of a judge 
include the following: 
(a) Personal interest in the case, including a spousal, parental or 
other close family, personal or professional relationship, or a 
subordinate relationship, with any of the parties; 
(b) Involvement, in his or her private capacity, in any legal pro-
ceedings initiated prior to his or her involvement in the case, or 
initiated by him or her subsequently, in which the person being 
investigated or prosecuted was or is an opposing party; 
(c) Performance of functions, prior to taking office, during 
which he or she could be expected to have formed an opinion 
on the case in question, on the parties or on their legal repre-
sentatives that, objectively, could adversely affect the required 
impartiality of the person concerned; 
(d) Expression of opinions, through the communications 
media, in writing or in public actions, that, objectively, could 
adversely affect the required impartiality of the person 
concerned.112 
It is for the absolute majority of the judges to decide on issues of 
independence and challenges.U3 Decisions are considered with-
out the participation of the individual judge. In matters relating to 
108. Id. art. 40 (2). 
109. Id. art. 40(3). 
110. Id. art. 41. 
111. See ICC, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, rs. 23-39, U.N. Doc PCNICC/2000/1/ 
Add.I (2002) [hereinafter ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence). 
112. Id. r. 34. 
113. ICC Statute, supra note 107, art. 40(4). 
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challenges, the individual judge can present his or her comments, 
but cannot take part in the decision.11 4 
Rule 33 further provides that if a judge seeks to be excused from 
his or her function, he or she needs to "make a request in writing 
to the Presidency," who will treat the request confidentially.us 
Finally, Rule 35 states that a judge should make a request to be 
excused if he or she has reason to believe that there are grounds 
for disqualification, without waiting for a request for disqualifica-
tion to be made. 11 6 
To date, a total of five requests for disqualification in three sepa-
rate situations have been brought, but all have been rejected.ll 7 
II. WHAT Do THE DATA SHow? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS oF 
CHALLENGE OUTCOMES 
The Section above highlights the rules that are most often 
applied in resolving challenges of judges and arbitrators in interna-
tional courts and tribunals. This Section assesses the result of the 
challenge requests in different courts and tribunals and elaborates 
on the reasons that parties used to bring a motion to challenge. 
A. Empirical Evaluation 
In order to properly evaluate challenge procedures, it is neces-
sary to know the outcomes of challenges. Until now, however, 
114. See id. arts. 40(4), 41(2) (c). 
115. ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 111, r. 33 ("1. A judge, the 
Prosecutor or a Deputy Prosecutor seeking to be excused from his or her functions shall 
make a request in writing to the Presidency, setting out the grounds upon which he or she 
should be excused. 2. The Presidency shall treat the request as confidential and shall not 
make public the reasons for its decision without the consent of the person concerned."). 
116. Id. r. 35. 
117. See Prosecutor v. Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Urgent Defence Application for the Dis-
qualification of Judge Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi (June 29, 2015), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/ CourtRecords/ CR20 l 5 _08830.PD F [h ttps:/ I perma.cc/ SK8C-MJPR]; Prosecutor v. 
Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Motion for the Disqualification of Judge C. Van den Wyngaert 
(May 30, 2014), https:/ /www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_04535.PDF [https:/ I 
perma.cc/QY6H-VAIJ]; Prosecutor v. Combo, ICC-01/05-01/13, Defence Request for the 
Disqualification of the Single Judge Curro Tarfusser (May 1, 2014), https:/ /www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_03836.PDF [https:/ /perma.cc/6KPC-Z6SU]; Prosecutor v. 
Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Defence Application for the Disqualification of Judge Sang-Hyun 
Song (Feb. 20, 2013), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2013_01589.PDF [https:/ 
/perma.cc/2D92-N6LS]; Prosecutor v. Nourain, ICC-02/05-03/09, Defence Request for 
the Disqualification of a Judge (Apr. 2, 2012), https:/ /www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/ 
CR2012_04486.PDF [https:/ /perma.cc/5U9X-RL24]. 
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those data were largely missing.us This Article provides the first 
collection and analysis of challenge requests across a variety of 
important international courts and tribunals.n9 
Table 1, below, shows the number of challenges made under the 
procedures in international courts and tribunals analyzed above, as 
well as their final outcomes.120 These data offer multiple interest-
ing insights. 
First, they show that, though increasing, challenge procedures 
continue to be quite rare. 121 In the entire history of the I CJ-since 
1946-only three cases were ever brought to the attention of the 
president of the court.122 International criminal tribunals and the 
ICC see a comparably higher number of challenges, but they also 
deal with a much higher number of cases and procedures.123 
Second, the data also demonstrate that challenge requests are 
very rarely accepted.1 24 No challenge or disqualification request 
has ever been upheld in a permanent court such as the ICJ or the 
ICC.125 In fact, although several requests were made in both per-
manent courts, none has ever been accepted. 126 
ll8. See Oellers-Frahm, supra note 12, ii. 20 (arguing that "the topic [of judges' 
recusals] needs more attention with the increasing number of international judges, which 
will probably lead to an increase in critical situations."). 
ll9. The data have been collected by the author and are available in her files. 
120. An important caveat applies. Because of confidentiality rules, not all cases are 
available. At times, even the existence of the case (and thus the challenge) remains com-
pletely confidential. At other times, the reasoning of the decision relating to a challenge 
remains confidential. Thus, this situation inevitably shows only a partial figure of the total 
number of cases. Further, there are still a number of challenges that are pending, so any 
data present a picture taken at a certain time. See generally Kinnear & Nitschke, supra note 
13, at 34-37 (providing statistical figures of disqualification challenges and cases regis-
tered, per year); Grimmer, supra note 69 (showing an overview of various challenges under 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules). 
121. For a thorough examination of the difficulties of collecting and interpreting chal-
lenge decisions in commercial arbitration, see Catherine A. Rogers & ldil Turner, Arbitrator 
Challenges: Too Many Or Not Enough?, in CONTEMPORARY IssuEs IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRA-
TION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2014 128, 129-30 (Oct. 2015). 
122. See infra Section I.B.l. 
123. See infra Section l.B.5. 
124. "Recent decisions have reinforced an increasingly widespread belief in the arbitra-
tion world that there exists only a remote chance of success when challenging arbitrators 
in ICSID proceedings. Indeed, while there have been over [forty] challenges lodged 
against sitting ICSID arbitrators since the early 1980s, successfully changing the composi-
tion of a tribunal has proven highly problematic in the absence of a voluntary resignation." 
Challenges to arbitrators under the ICSID Convention - Increasingly Common but Success remains 
Improbable, VOLTERRA FIETTA (Spring 2012), http:/ /www.volterrafietta.com/ challenges-to-
arbitrators-under-the-icsid-convention-increasingly-common-but-success-remains-improba-
ble/ [https://perma.cc/429A-XD96]. 
125. See infra Sections l.B.l & l.B.5. 
126. See infra Table 1. 
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Third, only one challenge has ever been upheld in an interna-
tional criminal court or tribunal, namely at the IC1Y, in the con-
troversial Seselj case, which was widely discussed in the professional 
press.127 No challenges were ever accepted at the ICTR or ICC, 
though many challenge proceedings were initiated.128 Similarly, 
none of the twenty-two challenges presented at the Iran-U.S. 
Claims Tribunal proceedings were upheld. 129 
Interestingly and unexpectedly, as challenge mechanisms in 
international arbitration have been deeply criticized, several inter-
national arbitrators were removed as a consequence of challenge 
procedures under both ICSID and UNCITRAL Rules. 130 Under 
the available data for UNCITRAL,131 of the twenty-eight arbitrator 
challenges submitted to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) 
for determination, seventeen were rejected, seven were upheld, 
three resulted in the resignation of the arbitrator, and one was 
withdrawn during settlement negotiations.132 In ICSID arbitration, 
eighty-four arbitrators were challenged, resulting in the rejection 
of fifty-six requests, the resignation of twenty-one arbitrators, and 
the withdrawal or discontinuation of three proposals.133 Only four 
challenges were upheld.134 Thus, twenty-two percent of the cases 
brought to the PCA for determination under UNCITRAL Rules 
were upheld, while only about five percent of the cases brought at 
ICSID resulted in the acceptance of the challenge.135 
127. See Press Release, supra note 103; see also Milanovic, supra note 104 (showing the 
challenge was widely discussed). 
128. See infra Section I.B.4. 
129. For an in-depth analysis of challenges at the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, see Lee M. 
Caplan, ArbitratM Challenges at the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, in CHALLENGES AND 
REcUSALS OF JUDGES AND ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, supra 
note 13, at 115. 
130. See generally Kinnear & Nitschke, supra note 13, at 43-46 (providing an overview of 
challenges at ICSID including the procedure to bring a challenge); Grimmer, supra note 
69 (providing an overview of various challenges under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules). 
131. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
132. For more detailed analysis, see Grimmer, supra note 69, at 83. 
133. Kinnear & Nitschke, supra note 13, at 35-37. 
134. Id. 
135. See Grimmer, supra note 69, at 83. 
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TABLE 1: ToTAL NUMBER OF KNoWN CHALLENGE CAsEs PER 
INSTITUTION AND THEIR RESULTS 
Institution Number of Result of Challenges 
Challene:es 
ICJ136 3 cases challenging 0 challenges upheld 
5 iudE!"es 
ICSID (as of 84 arbitrators 21 arbitrators resigned 
September 2014) 137 3 proposals withdrawn/discontinued 
56 declined 
4 upheld 
lran-U.S. Claims 22 cases 0 challenges upheld 
Tribunal 3 resigned/proposal withdrawn 
(UNCITRAL 9 dismissed on technical grounds (e.g., 
Rules) 138 untimely or failure to state reasons) 
10 dismissed for failure to establish 
I justifiable doubts 
PCA (1976 and 28 arbitrators (24 in 24 resulted in determination: 17 
2010 UNCITRAL investor-state challenges rejected and 7 upheld; 3 
Rules (as of end of arbitrations) resulted in the resignation of the 
2014) 139 challenged arbitrator; 1 withdrawn in 
the context of broader settlement 
negotiations 
International 5 judges in 3 0 accepted 
Criminal Court situations 
IC1Y140 27 motions in 12 1 accepted: challenge of Judge Harhoff 
cases141 (2013) 
ICTR 29 motions in 17 0 accepted 
cases142 
136. Giorgetti, supra note 42, at 28-32. 
137. Kinnear & Nitschke, supra note 13, at 35-37. 
138. Caplan, supra note 129, at 121-22. 
139. Grimmer, supra note 69, at 82-85. 
140. Prosecutor v. Vojislav Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Disqualification of Judge Frederik Harhoff and Report to the Vice-President, 'll'll 14-15 
(Int'! Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 28, 2013). 
141. Note that motions by the same defendant challenging multiple judges and cases 
in which challenges were filed by more than one defendant in a case were counted as one 
motion. The total number of judges challenged in all the motions is forty-eight; three 
entire trial chambers were also challenged. Data on file with the author. See, e.g., 
Prosecutor v. Blagojevia: & Jokia:, Case No. IT-02-60, Challenge of the Judges of Trial 
Chamber II (Int'! Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2003); Prosecutor v. 
Lukia: & Lukia:, Case No. IT-98-32/1, Challenge of the Trial Chamber (Int'! Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2008); Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, Case No. ICTR-96-15, 
Challenge to the Jurisdiction of Trial Chamber I Qune 3, 1999). 
142. Note that motions challenging multiple judges by the same defendant and cases 
in which challenges were filed by more than one defendant in a case were counted as one. 
The total number of judges challenged in all the motions is sixty-eight. Data on file with 
the author. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Karad_ia:, Case No. IT-95-5/18, Challenge to Judges 
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The overall success rate of challenge procedures, however, does 
not describe the full picture. In fact, a significant number of 
arbitrators preferred to resign from the panel once challenged, 
without waiting for the result of the challenge decision. 143 This 
may signal different issues, which remain necessarily speculative.144 
Resignation may be the result of a desire of an arbitrator not to 
disrupt the proceedings and simply withdraw from a case when one 
of the parties has lost trust in him or her. 145 Resignation may also 
be the consequence of the arbitrator's perceived likelihood of 
success of a legitimate challenge. 146 
Another reason that would result in the change of the 
composition of the bench includes a self-recusal from the judge 
him- or herself prior to challenge. This is the preferred method at 
the ICJ, for example, where judges are appointed for nine-year 
terms and the cases that they will face are not yet known. 147 A 
judge or an arbitrator could also be excused by the appointing 
authority before the conclusion of the challenge procedure. For 
example, in one of the most colorful stories related to challenges at 
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, the United States challenged two 
judges appointed by Iran after they physically attacked the Swedish 
judge in an attempt to remove him from the tribunal's premises. 148 
The United States challenged the two attacking judges and Iran 
withdrew them shortly thereafter. 149 
Thus, if one considers how often challenge of an arbitrator or 
judge results in the alteration of the composition of the tribunal 
(including the number of resignations of arbitrators), the data 
present a more nuanced picture: under the PCA/UNCITRAL 
rules, about a third of all the challenges result in a new 
composition of judges (nine of twenty-seven), while under ICSID 
Kwon, Morrison, Baird & Lattanzi (Int'l Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 2014); 
Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A, Oral Challenge to Judges Laity Kama and 
William Sekule (Dec. 7, 1999); Prosecutor v. Ntabakuze, Case No. ICTR-97-34, Challenge 
to the Judges of Trial Chamber III; Judges Williams, Ostrovsky, and Dolenc (Feb. 20, 
2002). 
143. See Kinnear & Nitschke, supra note 13, at 37; Grimmer, supra note 69, at 100. 
144. See Kinnear & Nitschke, supra note 13, at 37. 
145. See id. 
146. See id. 
147. Giorgetti, supra note 42, at 4. 
148. See Robert 0. Keohane et al., Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and 
Transnational, 54 INT'L. 0RG. 457, 471 (2000); see also Caplan, supra note 129, at 121-35 
(addressing challenges at the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal). 
149. Caplan, supra note 129, at 130. 
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the result is a little less than one third (twenty-five of eighty-
four) .150 
The same observation applies also in the context of other 
international courts and tribunals. Indeed, the composition of the 
bench of many courts and tribunals has changed as a result of self-
recusals.151 At the ICJ, severaljudges have recused themselves as a 
consequence of conflict of interests and past activities; this has also 
occurred at the IC1Y and the ICTR.152 
B. R.easons to Challenge 
Having discussed above the data available on challenge out-
comes, it is also valuable to explore some of the reasons that 
prompted challenges. Reasons to challenge vary significantly, and 
include both reasons that are pre-existing, such as personal or pro-
fessional connections and activities, as well as reasons that develop 
during the course of the arbitration, mostly involving the handling 
of the arbitration procedure.153 
Specifically, some of the reasons that resulted in the initiation of 
challenge proceedings include the professional or personal rela-
tionship of a judge or arbitrator with a party or counsel, including: 
the nomination to governmental post or international organiza-
tion; the merger of law firms, or the assumption of a partnership or 
adviser role; multiple appointments of an arbitrator by the same 
party or counsel; financial interest or link to one of the parties; the 
presence of a long-standing relationship; the fact that the arbitra-
tor or judge and counsel previously acted as co-counsel; profes-
sional contacts between the judge or arbitrator and counsel; family 
links between the judge or arbitrator and counsel for a party; per-
sonal animosity between a judge or arbitrator and counsel; and 
double-hatting.154 
Challenges were also brought for reasons linked to the conduct 
of proceedings,155 including financial dependence, failure to dis-
150. See Kinnear & Nitschke, supra note 13, at 35-37. 
151. See Giorgetti, supra note 42, at 17. 
152. See KoLB, supra note 44, at 132-37. 
153. Grimmer, supra note 69, at 97-104. 
154. Id. In a Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) case the respondent challenged 
the arbitrator appointed by the claimant on the grounds that the arbitrator's daughter was 
employed as an associate at a branch of the law firm representing the claimant. Id. at 104. 
The secretary general found that these circumstances satisfied the justifiable doubts test. 
Id. 
155. Such conduct-based challenges include, especially, Iran's challenges of the presi-
dents of tribunals-seven cases, six of which were dismissed by the appointing authority 
(and supported by the United States), with eight challenges total-but more recently also 
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close conflict, and improper conduct or behavior during the pro-
ceedings, 156 such as disclosure of deliberation, physical assault to 
another arbitrator, or failure to act. 157 
Other reasons for challenges include: statements made by the 
judge or arbitrator in prior awards and decisions outside the con-
text of a case decision or award (such as informal remarks or in 
academic writing), which give the impression that the arbitrator 
has developed a conflict;158 repeat appointments in related cases or 
cases addressing similar issues; involvement in previous related 
(domestic or international) proceedings; or prior knowledge of 
the case from other professional experience (diplomatic or policy-
related) .159 The challenge of one arbitrator may produce a chain 
effect, causing other members of the tribunal to be challenged by 
the opposing or same party. For example, at the PCA, more than 
one member was challenged in seven of the twenty-four challenges 
filed in investor-state arbitrations, and in four of those cases, chal-
lenges were lodged by one side against the arbitrator appointed by 
the other side within one month of each other. 160 
III. STRENGTHENING CHALLENGE AND REcusAL RuLES TO 
STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 
Part I of this Article analyzed the existing challenge procedures 
in some of the most relevant international courts and tribunals and 
showed that international judicial actors use many different mecha-
nisms to remove a judge or arbitrator who they believe has lost the 
required qualities to sit as a judge, namely his or her indepen-
used by Argentina in Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision 
on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Aug. 4, 2011), http:/ /www.italaw.com/sites/default/ 
files/ case-documents/ita0236.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/KB2K-U48P]. 
156. In the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, reasons alleged by Iran to challenge an arbitra-
tor include: that the arbitrator assisted claimants with their case; that the arbitrator regu-
larly interlered with the presentation of respondent's case; and that the arbitrator exerted 
an overbearing presence such that he controlled the deliberations of the tribunal. See 
Caplan, supra note 129, at 122-29. 
157. At the PCA: in a set of challenges against each member of one tribunal, the 
respondent party alleged that the tribunal had "persistently failed to devote the necessary 
time to rule on important issues in the arbitration," such that a reasonable observer would 
conclude that its conduct constituted an impermissible failure to act for the purposes of 
Article 13 of the Rules. Grimmer, supra note 69, at 112. The challenging party also 
invoked the law of the seat of arbitration that provided that the mandate of the tribunal 
could be terminated if, after repeated reminders, the tribunal carried out its mandate in 
an "unacceptably slow manner." Id. 
158. Id. at 106. 
159. Id. at 107-09. 
160. Id. at 82-83. 
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dence. Part I also highlighted some important differences and 
anomalies among the applicable procedures, and demonstrated 
that there is no one system, agreed upon by all, to challenge an 
international adjudicator. Part II examined the results of the appli-
cation of challenge procedures. It demonstrated that challenges 
are seldom successful regardless of the applicable procedural 
mechanisms. This conclusion is valid across the board, for all 
courts and tribunals, and it is also in line with the rate of chal-
lenges accepted in domestic procedures. 1 6 1 
This Part assesses and builds on these findings. Specifically, it 
argues that as the impact and use of international courts and tribu-
nals increases, the mechanisms that guarantee the statutory 
requirements that judges be independent and impartial become 
particularly important. Control mechanisms exercised by the par-
ties through challenge procedures need to be responsive, because 
international courts and tribunals must be seen as independent 
and impartial actors in the international community for their judg-
ments to be respected. This Part suggests two ways to correct 
existing anomalies that each build on the existing challenge sys-
tem: (I) increased use of external actors to decide challenges and 
(2) adoption of a common standard of review based on a reasona-
ble and informed third party. 
A International Courts and Tribunals: Independence and Control 
International actors increasingly rely on decisions by interna-
tional courts and tribunals for several reasons. Former ICJ Judge 
Kenneth Keith suggests several factors, as follows: 
161. There are very little data on tlie rate of recusals. The Judicial Disqualification 
Project, a 2008 report funded by tlie American Bar Association's Standing Committee on 
Judicial Independence, contains tlie most comprehensive information about recusals and 
disqualifications in tlie United States. The report indicates tliat only a few states maintain 
data on tlie rates of challenges and recusals, and also recommends tliat states begin to 
maintain tliis data in order to better illuminate tlie recusal process. See American Bar 
Association (ABA), Report of the Judicial Disqualification Project (Draft) 33, (Sept. 2008), http:/ 
/www.americanbar.org/ con tent/ dam/ aha/ administrative/judicial_independence/jdp_ 
geyh_report.autlicheckdam.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/5]26-YPPY]. There are some data avail-
able on Supreme Court recusals. According to an analysis of data from 1946-2010,Justices 
recuse tliemselves in 2.1 % of cases, on average. Robert]. Hume, Deciding Not to Decide: The 
Politics ofRecusals on the U.S. Supreme Court, 48 L. & Soc. REv. 621, 625 (2014). Justice Fortas 
had tlie highest rate of recusals, at 6.2%, and Justice Ginsberg had tlie lowest rate, at 
0.06%. Id. at 626. Most judges recuse tliemselves sua sponte, recusal motions are rarely 
filed, probably because litigants are reluctant to accuse tlie Justices of being biased. Id. at 
627. 
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1. [T]he changing international context which increasingly 
includes extensive international regulation the application of 
which gives rise to more and more disputes; 
2. [T]he related recognition by [s]tates that third party settle-
ment may have a necessary place in more and more of those 
areas of international relations; 
3. [T]he increasing recognition, at least as Qudge Keith] see[s] 
it, that the courts and tribunals are composed of well qualified, 
independent, conscientious judges following fair proceedings 
and deciding according to law.162 
231 
That judges are seen as independent is, then, one of the key rea-
sons that parties choose international judicial mechanisms. 163 
Once judges are selected, their independence is guaranteed by 
challenge procedures and controlled by the parties' ability to make 
challenges.164 
1. Challenge Mechanisms Guarantee the Independence of 
Judges and Arbitrators 
When states choose to go to international adjudication, "they 
choose to forego some amount of their sovereignty in favor of 
other values."165 These values include peaceful dispute resolution 
over use of force, universal human rights, addressing the concerns 
of international investment in the resolution of economic disputes, 
and the collective punishment of those who are accused of commit-
ting atrocities against humanity.166 Similarly, private parties' pref-
erence for international adjudication over domestic proceedings 
highlights the values of neutrality and comity.167 To ensure these 
choices remain valuable and justified, international proceedings 
offer certain guarantees of independence to users. 168 
Independence is an essential tenet of fair and unbiased proceed-
ings. Judicial independence is "recognized to be a significant fac-
tor in maintaining the credibility and legitimacy of international 
162. Keith, supra note 1, at 266. 
163. See generally Karen J. Alter, De/,egating to International Courts: Self-Binding vs. Other-
Binding De/,egation, 71 L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 37, 56-64 (2008) (demonstrating a prolifera-
tion in the number of international courts and its usage); Yuval Shany, No Longer a Weak 
Department of Power? Reflections on the Emergence of a New International Judiciary, 20 EuR. J. 
INT'L L. 73 (2009) (addressing the rise in the number of international courts and parties' 
increased invocation). 
164. See infra Sections 111.A.2-3. 
165. Nienke Grossman, Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies, 41 GEO. WASH. 
INT'L L. REv. 107, 159 (2009). 
166. Id. at 160. 
167. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in Favor of the Triumph of Arbitration, 10 CAR-
DOZO J. CoNFLICT REsoL. 395, 404 (2009). 
168. See Grossman, supra note 165, at 133. 
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courts and tribunals."169 Indeed, as highlighted above,170 the stat-
utes of every international court and tribunal require judges and 
arbitrators to be independent and impartial. 171 The IC1Y 
addressed this point and confirmed the importance of the inde-
pendence and impartiality of arbitrators and judges as a main 
requirement of a fair trial. 112 In the seminal case of Prosecutor v. 
Anto Furundiija, the Appeals Chamber of the IC1Y affirmed that 
"the fundamental human right of an accused to be tried before an 
independent and impartial tribunal is generally recognised as 
being an integral component of the requirement that an accused 
should have a fair trial. "173 
In addition to being an essential element of a fair trial, indepen-
dence of the judiciary also enhances the legitimacy of international 
courts and tribunals, understood as "the perception that an inter-
national adjudicative body possess justified authority, and that this 
perception may vary over time and across different international 
actors who may influence state preferences."174 Because interna-
tional courts and tribunals decide an increasing number of dis-
putes involving sovereign states that have important economic, 
political, and social implications, rules of procedure and control 
mechanisms related to ensuring the independence and impartial-
ity of judges and arbitrators are key components of legitimacy. 175 
Former International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) 
President, Rudiger Wolfrum, asserted that an authority is consid-
ered "legitimate because it exercises its powers through procedures 
seen as adequate or fair." 176 In particular, rules concerning the 
"composition or establishment of an institution and rules concern-
169. Mackenzie & Sands, supra note 9, at 271. 
170. See supra Part I. 
171. See Mackenzie & Sands, supra note 9, at 275 ("The statutes and rules of the various 
tribunals address the issue[s], at least in general terms, by setting out the criteria for quali-
fication as a judge and the requirements of independence and impartiality .... Although 
the formulations and practices vary, the rules demonstrate a general commitment to inde-
pendence and impartiality."). 
172. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17 /l-A99, Judgment, ii 177 (Int'! 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000). 
173. Id. 
174. Grossman, supra note 165, at 160 (also noting that a court would be perceived as 
legitimate if it is "fair and unbiased" and "transparent and infused with democratic 
norms"). 
175. See Oellers-Frahm, supra note 12, ii 33; see also RuTH MACKENZIE ET AL., SELECTING 
INTERNATIONAL JUDGES: PRINCIPLE, PROCESS, AND POLITICS (2010) (describing the global 
importance and mechanics of the judicial appointment process in the International Court 
of Justice and the International Criminal Court). 
176. Wolfrum, supra note 10, ii 7 (exploring the concept of legitimacy in international 
law). 
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ing its decision-making process may become relevant in this con-
text."177 The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
confirmed "[a]n international human rights tribunal which lacks 
independence cannot be legitimate. An international tribunal 
without legitimacy cannot be effective."178 It is important that, by 
being independent, international courts and tribunals are consid-
ered and perceived as holding legitimate authority by all 
constituencies. 
Moreover, an independent judiciary ensures that others trust 
and legitimize judicial actors, which in turn ensures institutional 
support and guarantees that the institution's awards and judg-
ments are respected and implemented.179 International courts and 
tribunals rely on their legitimacy to safeguard enforcement of their 
decisions.180 Indeed, there is no enforcement authority despite the 
legal mandate to ensure enforcement of their decisions.181 
The requirement of independence is exemplified in the process 
of selection and removal of judges and arbitrators. As in domestic 
systems, in the international context 'judicial independence has 
numerous dimensions" including procedures for nomination and 
selection.182 The most important criteria to assess the indepen-
dence of international judges are independent selection and ten-
ure.183 Challenge procedures relate to these criteria because they 
address concerns that parties may have after the judges' initial 
selection and during their tenure in office. The ECHR addressed 
the issue and, in Langborger v. Sweden, confirmed that "to establish 
whether a body can be considered 'independent,' regard must be 
had, inter alia, to the manner of appointment of its members and 
their term of office, to the existence of guarantees against outside 
pressures and to the question whether the body presents an 
177. Id. 
178. Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou & Donal K Coffey, Legitimacy and Independence of Interna-
tional Tribuna/,s: An Analysis of the Eurcpean Court of Human Rights, 37 HAsTINGS INT'L & 
CoMP. L. REv. 271, 272 (2014). 
179. On the debate between independence and effectiveness of international courts, 
see Posner & Yoo, supra note 11, at 7 (arguing that no such correlation exists); Helfer & 
Slaughter, supra note 11, 904-05 (responding to Posner and Yoo and arguing that the most 
effective courts are the most independent ones); Shany, supra note 11, 253-54 (suggesting 
a new, goal-oriented, approach to assess international judicial effectiveness). 
180. See supra Section III.A.I. 
181. See supra Section I.A. 
182. Mackenzie & Sands, supra note 9, at 276. 
183. Keohane et al., supra note 148, at 460 ("[T]he extent to which members of an 
international tribunal are independent reflects the extent to which they can free them-
selves from at least three categories of institutional constraints .... The most important 
criterion is independent selection and tenure."). 
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appearance of independence."184 Similarly, in Prosecutor v. Zejnil 
Delalic, the ICTY made this point clearly and explicitly, asserting 
that, 
[i]n determining whether a body can be considered to be inde-
pendent-notably of the executive and the parties in the case-
the Court has had regard to the manner of appointment of its 
members and the duration of their term of office, the existence 
of guarantees against outside pressures and the question 
whether the body presents an appearance of independence.185 
The Sections below explain how challenge procedures guarantee 
the independence of judges and arbitrators by providing the par-
ties with an opportunity to correct any potential lack of indepen-
dence or appearance of lack of independence. 
2. Challenge Mechanisms Allow Parties to Control the 
Independence of Judges and Arbitrators 
Decisions of international courts and tribunals are processes that 
are essentially voluntary and consensual.186 Parties participating in 
these processes maintain an expectation of certain specific forms 
of control,187 where "[c]ontrol is concerned with maintenance of 
the minimum conditions necessary for the continuation of the pro-
cess of decision itself."188 Challenges are thus important mecha-
nisms by which parties, both states and individuals, exercise control 
over the independence of international judges and arbitrators 
once they have been appointed.189 That parties have this control 
allows for the continuation of the process of decision-making by 
guaranteeing the independence of judges and arbitrators. 
Challenges as a control mechanism are also important because 
they ensure that parties remain engaged and satisfied with the pro-
ceedings. Indeed, when mechanisms of control break down, actors 
may choose other mechanisms to resolve disputes. 190 Retaining 
challenges as a control mechanism is also particularly important in 
184. Langborger v. Sweden, 155 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1989). 
185. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision of the Bureau on Motion on 
Judicial Independence (Int'! Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 4, 1998) (quoting 
Campbell & Fell v. United Kingdom, 80 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 39-40 (1984)), http:// 
www.icty.org/x/ cases/mucic/tdec/ en/80904MSX5309.htm [https:/ /perma.cc/86BR-
3MBX]. 
186. W. Michael Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration, 
1989 DuKE LJ. 740, 743 (1989). 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 748. 
189. Another important control mechanism is the selection process itself. For the 
author's work on selection, see generally Giorgetti, supra note 8. 
190. See Reisman, supra note 186, at 743. 
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an international judicial setting, which lacks a systematic and hier-
archical organization and is based on voluntary commitments.191 
In this day and age, the exercise of that control is also important 
because, as a consequence of the increased recourse to interna-
tional courts and tribunals, there are also more challenge requests 
filed by the parties. 192 Indeed, the topic of challenges "needs more 
attention with the increasing number of international judges, 
which will probably lead to an increase in critical situations."193 
3. Independence and Control in Current Challenge Procedures 
Similar to existing debates on the domestic level, 194 avoiding 
"the appearance of bias by judges in international courts and tribu-
nals" has become an important concern in the international con-
text.195 There is no single mechanism to challenge international 
judges and arbitrators.196 Some of the mechanisms that presently 
exist to ensure the possibility of challenging judges and arbitra-
tors-and thus that have a control function in guaranteeing inde-
pendence-may not be seen as providing a sufficient guarantee of 
independence. 
191. See generally Lorns HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAw AND FOREIGN Poucv 23-24 
(2d ed. 1979) (discussing the limitations of international law, specifically that the law of 
nations is based upon states' voluntary obligations to one another and lacks an "effective 
judiciary to clarify and develop the law, to resolve disputes impartially, and to impel 
nations to observe the law."). 
192. VoLTERRA-FIETTA, supra note 124 ("In recent years, there has been a proliferation 
of challenges to arbitrators in international investment treaty arbitrations. . . . This 
proliferation may be attributed to various factors, including: (i) conflicts arising from the 
fact that a rapidly expanding caseload has jeopardi[z)ed the perceived independence of 
individuals who have acted as counsel or sat as arbitrator in numerous proceedings; (ii) the 
perception that parties are, in any case, increasingly interested in the impartiality of their 
tribunal; and (iii) the desire by some parties to d"isrupt and delay proceedings to the maxi-
mum possible extent."). 
193. Oellers-Frahm, supra note 12, , 20. 
194. There is abundant literature that studies this issue domestically, but the issue is 
newer for international courts and tribunals, which, as dispute resolution fora, have only 
more recently acquired "teeth." See, e.g., Leslie W. Abramson, Speci.fjing Grounds for judicial 
Disqualification in Federal Courts, 72 NEB. L. REv. 1046 (1993) (addressing whether domestic 
courts avoid the appearance of bias by allowing a judge to be disqualified sua sponte or by 
motion of one of the parties for a proscribed conflict of interest under 28 U .S.C. § 455 (b)); 
Leslie W. Abramson, Deciding Recusal Motions: Who judges the judges?, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 543 
(1994) (discussing whether and how a judge must, may, or cannot refer a motion to dis-
qualify another judge); Debra Lyn Bassett, judicial Disqualification in the Federal Appellate 
Courts, 87 IowA L. REv. 1213 (2002) (discussing the need for significant revisions to 
existing disqualification procedures for federal appellate judges); Debra Lyn Bassett, 
Recusal and the Supreme Court, 55 HASTINGS LJ. 657 (2005) (discussing the constitutional 
and enforcement issues of recusal in the United States Supreme Court). 
195. Mackenzie & Sands, supra note 9, at 272. 
196. See supra Section I.A. 
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Further, it 1s extremely difficult to remove an arbitrator or a 
judge under the present rules. 197 Most courts and tribunals, 
including such important institutions as the ICJ and the ICC, have 
not seen any case of successful challenge proceedings.198 This is 
not problematic per se. In domestic proceedings the rate of 
accepted challenges is also very low.199 In the United States, for 
example, available data are limited to self-recusal by members of 
the Supreme Court, and show that from 1946-2010, Justices 
recused themselves in 2.1 % of cases.200 Domestic statistics may not 
necessarily be a good baseline for comparison, however, as the 
international adjudicatory system is substantially different from the 
domestic one.201 Still, there appears to be much more interest in 
international judicial challenges, while domestic challenges remain 
a relatively uncontested issue.202 
Moreover, a problem arises if the low rate of successful chal-
lenges is seen as the result of unfair procedures.203 As the use of 
international courts increase and more parties select international 
proceedings, avoiding any appearance of bias becomes increasingly 
important to ensure the existence of the system. Challenge and 
recusal procedures must be seen as fair and legitimate. 
First, it is important that decisions regarding challenges are 
made by an authority that is considered independent and legiti-
mate. As Mackenzie and Sands note: 
In many cases these general formulations are supplemented by 
more detailed rules guiding, for example, when judges ought to 
recuse themselves. In some cases, international courts have 
extremely strict rules prohibiting all forms of outside activity as a 
means of ensuring independence. In other cases, the guidelines 
are more flexible. Although the formulations and practices 
197. See supra Section II.A. 
198. See id. 
199. See generally ABA, supra note 161 (indicating that only a few states maintain data on 
the rates of challenges and recusals). 
200. See Hume, supra note 161, at 625. 
201. The author is grateful to Catherine Rogers for this comment. In contrast to an 
international tribunal, for example, the United States' federal judiciary is based on perma-
nent judges, cases are often assigned after pre-screening, and bases for recusals are 
different. 
202. The author wishes to thank Susan Franck for this insight. On international chal-
lenges, a recent six-part story investigates investor-state dispute settlement that appeared 
on Buzzfeed. Chris Hamby, Secrets of a Global Super Court, BuzzFEEn, https:/ / 
www.buzzfeed.com/globalsupercourt [https://perma.cc/VC9A-4Y5J] (last visited Oct. 21, 
2016). 
203. See id. 
2016] Between Legi.timacy and Control 
vary, the rules demonstrate a general commitment to indepen-
dence and impartiality.204 
237 
Second, when deciding on challenge and recusal requests, the 
same standard of independence and appearance of independence 
should be upheld. Certainly, in the context of international courts 
and tribunals "the guiding principle seems to be that 'the appear-
ance of fairness is as important as fairness itself[,]'" because the 
appearance of fairness promotes the confidence of the public in 
the legitimacy of international courts and tribunals.205 Thus, 
"[l] egitimizing international adjudicators increases trust in the rule 
of law, persuading governments and private disputants to rely upon 
international courts and tribunals."206 Tribunals themselves have 
recognized this principle. As the ICTY asserted in Furundiija, a tri-
bunal is required "not only [to be] genuinely impartial, but also 
[to] appear[] to be impartial."201 
Third, the appearance-of-independence requirement must also 
be preserved when assessing challenge requests. At present, cer-
tain rules-notably ICSID's-require a "manifest" or objective stan-
dard while other rules-for example, the ICJ's-do not explicitly 
require any standard of review.208 Moreover, the present system 
allows, in certain cases (and notably at ICSID), fellow arbitrators to 
decide on challenges. 209 This does not fulfill the appearance-of-
independence requirement, and thus undermines the normative 
and sociological legitimacy of courts and tribunals. 
B. tvho Decides the Challenge? 
Currently, decisions are made either by the remaining members 
of the court or by an external or semi-external body.210 However, 
204. Mackenzie & Sands, supra note 9, at 275. 
205. Joseph R. Brubaker, The Judge Who Knew Too Much: Issue Conflicts in International 
Adjudication, BERKELEY]. INT'L L. lll, 113 (2008). 
206. Id. 
207. Prosecutor v. Furund_ija, Case No. IT-95-17 /l-A99, Judgment, 'll 182. 
208. See supra Section l.B. l. 
209. See supra Section l.B.3. 
210. See supra Section J.B. This challenge system, where the remaining judges decide 
by majority issues of recusals, mirrors the system used in domestic courts. Still, interna-
tional and domestic systems are very different, such that what works in domestic systems 
does not necessarily translate to the international system. Indeed, there may be a higher 
requirement for independence in international courts, which lack a police force to enforce 
their decisions and rely on voluntary agreements. Moreover, and more cogently, the 
domestic system itself is not immune from criticism. See generally, Pamela S. Karlan, Electing 
judges, Judging Elections, and the Lessons of Caperton, 123 HARV. L. REv. 80 passim (2009) 
(discussing the challenges of an election system where individuals with matters before the 
Court are able to contribute to judicial campaigns); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations 
238 The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. [Vol. 49 
having an external actor decide on the delicate matter of removal 
of a judge or an arbitrator is preferable to a decision by the remain-
der of members of the court, because this ensures that an indepen-
dent entity, not vested in the specific case, decides this 
fundamental matter. 
Under some procedural rules, decisions on challenges are taken 
by an external body. Under UNCITRAL Rules, for example, the 
appointing authority decides on challenges.211 Under other rules, 
the decision is taken by a body that is external to the case, but still 
within the judicial organ.212 At the IC1Y, the IC1Y president may 
appoint a panel of three judges from other chambers to report to 
him or her their decision on the challenge application.213 At the 
ICTR, it is the Bureau, composed of the president, the vice-presi-
dent, and the presiding judge of the Trial Chambers, that decides 
on the request.214 
Requiring an international court or tribunal to hand challenge 
decisions to an external or semi-external actor could pose draw-
backs, however. For example, a decision taken by an external actor 
may take longer than a decision taken in-house. Indeed, the decid-
ing authority may be required to review voluminous case materials 
with which he or she is not familiar, but which would be utterly 
familiar to judges and arbitrators participating in the case.215 
Practice, however, shows that this is not necessarily the case. For 
example, an external party may be able to reach a decision in a 
matter of months. In a case relating to the challenge of two ICSID 
arbitrators brought by respondent Argentina, it was decided that 
the secretary general of the PCA would recommend a course of 
action, as required by prior agreement of the parties.216 The secre-
tary general of the PCA had not been part of the litigation prior to 
Obey International Law?, 106 YALE LJ. 2599 passim (1997) (providing background on the 
complex and multi-dimensional reasoning behind a nation's choice to follow international 
law); Arny Brittain & Sari Horwitz, justice Scalia Spent His Last Hours with Members of This 
Secretive Society of Elite Hunters, WASH. PosT (Feb. 24, 2016), https:/ I 
www.washingtonpost.com/world/ national-security /justice-scalia-spen t-his-last-hours-with-
members-of-this-secretive-society-of-eli te-hun ters/2016 I 02/ 24/ 1d77af38-db20-l l e5-89 la-
4ed04f 42l3e8_story .html [https:/ /perma.cc/WE7U-AGPQ] (describing the secret friend-
ships judges can have, which calls into question the legitimacy of the body). 
211. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 59, art. 13(4). 
212. See supra Section LB. 
213. See supra Section l.B.4. 
214. See id. 
215. See infra note 216 and accompanying text. 
216. See Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07 /5, Recommendation 
Pursuant to the Request by ICSID Dated November 18, 2011 on the Respondent's Proposal 
for the Disqualification of Professor Pierre Tercier and Professor Albert Jan Van Den Berg 
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the request, and to make an informed decision he asked to review 
the entire file. 217 This required all the documents to be sent to 
The Hague.218 The underlying ICSID proceedings were sus-
pended, and the decision was issued on December 19, 2011, 
approximately three months after Argentina filed its request and 
only one month after the request was sent to the PCA.219 Thus, 
though the proceedings were delayed, the delay was minimal and 
in line with the length of challenge proceedings decided by an 
internal actor.22° This example demonstrates that an external 
actor can efficiently take decisions on urgent and delicate matters 
related to challenges. 
An additional concern about appointing an external or semi-
external actor is that he or she may not be bound by the same 
confidentiality requirements as the adjudicators. 221 This is a valid 
concern, but one that can easily be overcome by imposing on the 
deciding authority confidentiality obligations. 
Another important issue to consider is that an external actor 
may not be as familiar with the applicable rules of procedure; how-
ever, it is important that someone familiar with the rules is chosen 
to take challenge decisions. In international arbitration under 
UNCITRAL Rules, for example, it is the appointing authority that 
decides on challenges.222 Because the appointing authority was 
involved in the initial selection of the challenged arbitrator, he or 
she will be familiar with the rules applicable to the proceedings. 223 
When procedural rules call for an external or semi-external 
actor to decide challenges, several methods can be used to estab-
Dated September 15, 2011, 1[ 24 (Dec. 19, 2011), http:/ /www.italaw.com/sites/default/ 
files/ case-documents/ita0240. pelf [https:/ /perma.cc/FJ5X-DXMU]. 
217. See id. 'll 27. 
218. See id. 'll'll 33, 42. 
219. See id. 'll'll 15-43 (procedural history). 
220. For example, in a subsequent challenge in the same case decided by the secretary 
general of ICSID, Argentina filed its request on December 19, 2013 and January 13, 2014, 
and the decision was issued on February 4, 2014. Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/07 /5, Decision on the Proposal to Disqualify a Majority of the Tribunal, 'll'll 
45-46, 83 (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ 
italaw3057.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/57C9-TZE3]. 
221. On the issue of confidentiality, see Neale H. Bergman, Transparency of the Proceed-
ings and Third Party Participation, in LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES: A 
PRACTITIONER'S GumE 375 (Chiara Giorgetti ed., 2014) (discussing the shift towards more 
transparent arbitration procedures, while maintaining protection for confidential mat-
ters); Loretta Malintoppi, Methods of Dispute Resolution in Inter-State Litigation: When States Go 
to Arbitration Rather Than Adjudication, 5 L. & PRAc. INT'L CT. & TRIBUNALS 133, 140 (2006). 
222. See supra Section l.B.2. 
223. See id. 
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lish that external body. In arbitration under UNCITRAL Rules, 
the external actor is the appointing authority.224 Other interna-
tional courts use a semi-external actor to decide on challenges. 
The ICTR and IC1Y, for example, constitute a special ad hoc body 
composed of judges not involved in the specific proceedings at 
issue.225 Thus, at the IC1Y, if a challenge arises, the chamber's pre-
siding judge confers first with the judge in question, and then, if 
necessary, the IC1Y president appoints a panel of three judges 
from other chambers to report their decision on the merits of the 
challenge to the president.226 Similarly, at the !CTR, the cham-
ber's presiding judge would first confer with the judge in question 
and then, if necessary, the Bureau (composed of the ICTR presi-
dent, the vice-president, and the presiding judge of the Trial 
Chambers) would determine the merits of the challenge.227 This 
structure is possible because both the !CTR and the IC1Y are 
divided into Trial Chambers and Appeals Chambers, while other 
courts decide en bane. 22s 
Using a body external to the arbitrators or creating a separate 
body-within the court-of judges who take no part in the specific 
case maintains the independence of judges and ensures that there 
is no appearance of bias.229 Moreover, it strengthens the legiti-
macy of the forum and thus the effectiveness of its decisions.230 
Though an external or semi-external entity can be constructed 
in different ways per procedural rules, not all courts and tribunals 
rely on this mechanism to decide challenges. Generally, perma-
224. See id. 
225. See supra Section I.B.4. 
226. See id. 
227. ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 93, rs. 15, 23. 
228. Organisational Chart: Organisation of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugosla.. 
via, ICTY, http:/ /www.icty.org/ en/ about/tribunal/ organisational-chart [https:/ I 
perma.cc/8NAH-MRUH] (last visited Oct. 21, 2016); U.N. Mechanism for the Int'! Crim. 
Tribunals, Chambers, ICTR, http://unictr.unmict.org/en/tribunal/chambers [https:// 
perma.cc/PQU2-HDRJJ (last visited Oct. 21, 2016). 
229. For a review of the meaning of impartiality, and interesting empirical assessment 
of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), see Erik Voten, The Impartiality of Inter-
national Judges: Evidence from the Euro-pean Court of Human Rights, 102 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 417, 
417 (2008) (additionally stating, "Despite the consensus that impartiality is the cornerstone 
of effective international adjudication, there is no agreement on whether or under what 
circumstances international judges can indeed be relied upon to impartially resolve dis-
putes. Some scholars argue that governments exert a great deal of influence over the 
choices of even formally independent international judges. Others, however, counter that 
the ability of governments to monitor and sanction judges is generally weak and ineffective 
at swaying judges.") (internal citations omitted). 
230. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 11, 904-05 (responding to Posner and Yoo and 
arguing that the most effective courts are the most independent ones). 
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nent courts do not use an external or semi-external actor to take 
decisions on challenges. In permanent courts, like the ICJ and the 
ICC, decisions are typically taken by a majority of the judges, with-
out the participation of the challengedjudge.231 For example, the 
ICC is-similarly to the ICTY and !CTR-composed of Trial and 
Appeals Chambers, yet the majority of the full court decides chal-
lenges. 232 The views of the challenged judge are normally heard 
and taken into consideration, but the challenged judge can neither 
participate in the deliberation of the court on the matter, nor take 
part in the voting.233 
Some may link the differences in procedures amongst interna-
tional courts and tribunals with the discrepancy in tenure amongst 
the different international adjudicators as a possible explanation 
for diverse challenge procedures. Security of tenure and mode of 
election may be important in assessing judicial behavior during 
challenge proceedings. At the ICJ, for example,judges serve nine-
year terms and they can be re-elected.234 At the ICC, judges also 
serve for nine years, but can only serve for one term. 235 In con-
trast, judges at the ICTY and ICTR are elected for four-year terms 
but may be re-elected multiple times.236 Arbitrators, on the other 
hand, typically sit for much shorter periods237: they are appointed 
for a specific case and when the case terminates, their mandate 
ends as well, though they are very often repeat players.238 Thus, 
one could argue that a longer term (as at the ICJ) or a unique term 
(as at the ICC) may guarantee a more independent judiciary and 
thus could justify members of the court themselves taking chal-
lenge decisions directly. 
231. See supra Sections I.B.l, I.B.5. 
232. See supra Section I.B.5. 
233. See id. 
234. ICJ Statute, supra note 36, art. 13. 
235. ICC Statute, supra note 107, art. 36(9) (a) ("OJudges shall hold office for a term of 
nine years and subject to [two minimal and enumerated exceptions] shall not be eligible 
for re-election."). 
236. Election Process, IC1Y, http:/ /www.icty.org/en/about/chambers/election-process 
[https:/ /perma.cc/38Y3-2WN3] ("Permanent judges serve for a term of four years after 
which they are eligible for re-election.") (last visited Oct. 13, 2016); ICTR, supra note 228 
(regarding ICTR election procedures, "All of the judges were elected by the United 
Nations General Assembly from a list submitted by the Security Council. The Judges were 
elected for a term of [four] years and were eligible for re-election."). 
237. See generally Chiara Giorgetti, The Arbritrial Tribunal: Selection and Replacement of 
Arbitrators, in LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE, 
145, 145 (Chiara Giorgetti ed., 2014) (describing the process in international investment 
arbitrations of party and third-party appointment of the arbitration panel members). 
238. See Giorgetti, supra note 8, at 454. 
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However, critics also point out that judges may be cognizant of 
length and security of tenure when making decisions, such that 
they may be more cautious or inclined to find for a state or an 
appointing actor when the judges are subject to re-election. 239 
Others view judges' re-election as a safety mechanism to ensure a 
less idiosyncratic judiciary and are more inclined to view changes 
in the bench positively.240 Thus, based on the possibility of re-elec-
tion, one might argue that judges at the ICJ, IC1Y, or ICTR would 
be more inclined to find for the state or an appointer than a judge 
at the ICC. The length of tenure may also play a role, as a judge or 
an arbitrator whose re-election or re-appointment is on the line 
may be more attentive to the appointing authority. 
Yet, the difference in tenure itself may not be as staggering as 
initially perceived. For example, once their term in one court is 
terminated and cannot be renewed, several judges seek election in 
other international courts and tribunals. 241 It is also the case that 
judges and arbitrators increasingly sit on several cases at one time, 
which may intensify possible conflicts and the appearance of 
bias.242 
Thus, though the system of self-recusals and full court decisions 
have worked in the past, the current situation of increased use of 
international judicial bodies-and the ensuing increase in the 
number of judicial actors-may require a rethinking of what con-
stitute the best challenge procedures.243 
Another argument to justify the different challenge procedures 
in the various international courts and tribunals is the fact that per-
239. See generally Mackenzie & Sands, supra note 9, at 278-79 (stating that elections to 
the ICJ are "highly politicized" and "[w]ithout the support of any influential states, the 
electoral prospects for any candidate would be slim. . . . Elections involving judges stand-
ing for re[-]election can focus on cases decided by the judge. This practice raises many 
eyebrows."). 
240. Id. 
241. For example, ICJ Judge Julia Sebutinde, who before joining the ICJ was a judge at 
the Special Court of Sierra Leone. See Current Members. judge Julia Sebutinde, INT'L CT. JusT., 
http:/ /www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pl=l&p2=2&p3=l&judge=l94 [https:/ I 
perma.cc/YH26-RPH3] (last visited Oct. 13, 2016). Another example is Judge Elizabeth 
Odio Benito, who was a judge at the IC1Y from 1993 to 1998 and was elected to the ICC in 
2003. See judge Elizabeth Odio Benito, U.N. AumoVISUAL LIBR. INT'L L., http:/ /legal.un.org/ 
avl/pdf/ls/Odio-Benito_bio.pdf [https://perma.cc/664N-NS3S] (last visited Oct. 13, 
2016). Similarly, Judge Bruno Simma was nominated to judge at the Iran-U.S. Claims Tri-
bunal after serving at the ICJ. See John Masson, MLaw Prof Appointed to Iran-United States 
Claims Tribuna~ M1cH. L. NEWSROOM (Nov. 6, 2012), https://www.law.umich.edu/new-
sandinfo/features/Pages/simma_appointment.aspx [https:/ /perma.cc/E8YE-9YJQ]. 
242. For a thorough analysis of the relationships between arbitrators and their cases, 
see Sergio Puig, Social Capital in the Arbitration Market, 25 EuRo.]. INT'L L. 387 (2014). 
243. See Giorgetti, supra note 42, at 4, 15-18. 
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manent courts are typically constituted by a substantial number of 
judges.244 The ICJ has fifteen judges, and the ICC eighteen.245 
The approach of letting the remaining members of a permanent 
court decide on the removal of one of its members may initially 
seem reasonable because the number of judges in the respective 
courts dilutes the relevance of the vote of any particular judge. 
Though this argument may ease concern for an appearance of 
bias, it is not ideal for members of the same court to decide on 
whether a fellow judge should sit on a certain case.246 Even if the 
membership of the court is large, it can still create conflicts, resent-
ment, and uneasiness.247 Moreover, the esprit de groupe may make 
members of the same group (in this case the court) reluctant to 
decide against another member, as they may do in an otherwise 
similar situation. 24s 
244. See supra Sections I.B.l, l.B.5. 
245. ICJ Statute, supra note 36, art. 3 and ICC Statute, supra note 107, art. 36, 
respectively. 
246. Witness, for example, the current debate on the replacement of Justice Scalia of 
the U.S. Supreme Court. The issue of recusal was engendered by the fact that the Justice 
was found in a resort and it was unclear who had paid for the stay or the charter plane 
there. The question of recusal of Justices was also discussed in a 2011 report by Chief 
Justice Roberts, who noted that while lower domestic courts can substitute for one another, 
there is only one U.S. Supreme Court, and "if a Justice withdraws from a case, the Court 
must sit without its full membership." Sup. Ct. of the U.S., 2011 Year-End Report on the 
Federal Judiciary 9 (2011). As the Washington Post reported: 
Roberts issued his report at the end of a year in which more than 100 law profes-
sors nationwide asked Congress to give the Supreme Court an ethical code of 
conduct after it emerged that Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas had attended 
private political meetings sponsored by billionaire conservative donors David and 
Charles Koch. That same year, Kagan was called on to recuse herself from hear-
ing challenges to health-care reform, and a watchdog group said Thomas had 
failed to report his wife's income from a conservative think tank before he 
amended his financial forms. [Roberts added that] it would not be wise for 
OJustices to review the recusal decisions made by the their peers. He said that "it 
would create an undesirable situation" enabling OJustices to play a role in deter-
mining which others get to weigh in on cases. He said, "I have complete confi-
dence in the capability of my colleagues to determine when recusal is warranted," 
[and that] " [ t] hey are jurists of exceptional integrity and experience whose char-
acter and fitness have been examined through a rigorous appointment and con-
firmation process." 
Mark Berman &Jerry Markon, Why justice Scalia was Staying for Free at a Texas Resort, WASH. 
PosT (Feb. 17, 2016), https:/ /www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/02/ 
17 /justice-scalias-death-and-questions-about-who-pays-for-supreme-courtjustices-to-visit-
remote-resorts/?hpidHP _rhp-top-table-main_scalia-resort-925am %3Ahomepage% 2Fstory 
[https:/ / perma.cc/J8XE-RV3JJ. 
247. See generalry Todd Tucker, Inside the Black Box: Collegial Patterns on Investment Tribu-
nals, 7 J. INT'L. D1sP. SETTLEMENT 183 (2016) (examining the collegial dynamics of within 
investment tribunals). 
248. See generally ROBERT KOLB, THE ELGAR COMPANION TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 
OF JUSTICE 81 (2014) (discussing the esprit de corps versus the concept of autonomy among 
the justices of the ICJ); Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment 
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Still, it may be justifiable to ask all the members of the court to 
decide a challenge because judges in permanent courts are elected 
through an intricate process that involves national nomination 
committees, states, and several organs of the United Nations.249 
This presumably insulates the judges from fear of retaliation or 
uneasiness in their position.250 
However, though it is true that judges in permanent interna-
tional courts are not nominated directly by the parties-as is the 
case in arbitration-but indirectly by governments, this does little 
to undermine the argument that to avoid the appearance of bias, 
decisions on challenges should be taken by an external actor.251 
Indeed, in this day and age, much more is expected of members of 
the international judiciary. To reinforce their independence and 
appearance of independence,252 decisions on challenges would be 
stronger if taken by an independent and super partes body. 
Permanent tribunals have several options to establish indepen-
dent bodies responsible for deciding challenges. For example, 
retired judges and former ICJ presidents could be asked to assume 
the role of advisers in such matters. The use of an external deci-
sion-maker may also be envisaged. For example, the Rules of Pro-
cedure of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commissions (which 
adopted modified UNCITRAL Rules) specified that if a commis-
sioner were to be challenged, the U.N. Secretary General would be 
tasked with naming an "Appointing Authority" to resolve the chal-
lenge.253 Alternatively, but less preferably, in the case of the ICJ, 
the process could be strengthened internally: where the court gen-
erally decides en bane, a standing committee on disciplinary mat-
ters or judicial ethics could be created, composed of the president, 
the vice-president, and certain nominated members of the court, 
to give advice to the entire court on the challenge application. 
Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REv. 1, 75 (2007) (empirically assessing the claim that arbitra-
tors are "Pale, Male and Stale" or "Mafia"). 
249. For more on the election of judges at the ICJ and ICC, see MACKENZIE ET AL., supra 
note 175, at 102. 
250. See ICJ Statute, supra note 36, art. 2; ICC Statute, supra note 107, art. 36; KoLB, 
supra note 44, at 138; Giorgetti, supra note 42, at 3-5. 
251. See MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 175, at 26 (discussing general selection criteria 
for judges); Giorgetti, supra note 237, at 146. 
252. See Giorgetti, supra note 8, at 453. 
253. Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Comm'n, Rules of Procedure, art. 6(6) (2001) ("If the 
other party does not agree to the challenge and the challenged arbitrator does not with-. 
draw, the decision on the challenge will be made by an Appointing Authority designated 
by the Secretary General of the United Nations. Pending the Appointing Authority's deci-
sion, the challenged arbitrator shall continue to serve as an arbitrator of the Commission, 
and the Commission shall continue to perform its duties under the Agreement."). 
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The ICC, on the other hand, could adopt mechanisms similar to 
either the IC1Y or the ICTR.254 
The situation is more urgent at ICSID. As provided by the appli-
cable rules, decisions on challenges to the majority of the tribunal, 
sole arbitrators, or when the remaining arbitrators do not agree 
are taken by the chairman of the Administrative Council (and pres-
ident of the World Bank) .255 This procedure allows for an inde-
pendent and generally expeditious review, detached from the 
proceedings. 256 These decisions are taken expeditiously and by 
someone familiar with the rules and with easy access to the case.257 
However, when only one arbitrator is challenged on a three-arbitra-
tor panel, ICSID's procedures are wanting.258 In these situations, 
under the ICSID Convention, the remaining two members of the 
tribunal decide on the challenge.259 
This procedure raises many concerns. First, it puts the two 
remaining arbitrators in an untenable (and unenviable) position 
of having to decide on the disqualification of someone with whom 
they unavoidably have a working relation. Given the small pool of 
arbitrators, the challenged arbitrator would also be someone 
whom the remaining members may soon encounter again as either 
counsel, fellow arbitrator, or someone in front of whom they may 
appear as counsel.260 Moreover, the complexity of deciding the 
removal of a fellow arbitrator is corroborated by the available data. 
Indeed, of the eighty-four challenge requests filed at ICSID, in only 
one case have the two remaining arbitrators decided to uphold the 
request and disqualify the challenged arbitrator.261 
254. See supra Sections l.B.4, l.B.5. 
255. ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 77, r. 9. 
256. See supra Section l.B.3. 
257. Id. 
258. VoLTERRA-FIETTA, supra note 124. The article further notes the following: 
Id. 
The second perceived flaw relates to the procedural method by which decisions 
on disqualification are made. In this regard, it has been argued that there is a 
certain illogic to placing these decisions in the hands of a challenged individual's 
co-arbitrators. There are several potential reasons for concern. Those co-arbitra-
tors may have been working with that individual for some time and be reluctant 
to acknowledge any bias. Further, they may have extensive personal relationships 
with the individual which might influence their decision. Finally, there may be an 
underlying reluctance (however unconscious) to "cut the branch of the tree on 
which they were sitting"-namely, a hesitancy for arbitrators to allow challenges 
to succeed when that might consequently increase the chances of a successful 
challenge being made against them. 
259. See id.; see also ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 77, r. 9. 
260. On the issue of the small pool of arbitrators, see Puig, supra note 242, at 388. 
261. Caratube Int'l Oil Co. LLP & Hourani v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/13/13, Decision on the Proposal for Disqualification of Mr. Bruno Boesch, ii 111 
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Instead, it would be more desirable if the two remaining, un-
challenged arbitrators declined to decide, and as a matter of 
course sent the decision to the chairman of the Administrative 
Council. This course of action could be an acceptable reading of 
the ICSID Convention, which provides that if the "members are 
equally divided," the decision is taken by the chairman.262 Indeed, 
it is possible to envisage that arbitrators can remain divided and 
thus request the chairman to decide on each case. 
In sum, while a decision by the remaining members of the court 
may be understandable in certain circumstances, as explained, an 
external or semi-external decision-maker is the preferable choice 
to resolve challenge requests. This is especially true for arbitral 
tribunals, which are composed by only a small number of arbitra-
tors. That an external decision-maker for challenges is the right 
course of action and is responsive to public expectations is further 
supported by the wording of the newly negotiated E.U.-Canada 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, which calls for 
decisions on challenges of arbitrators to be made by the ICJ 
president. 263 
(Mar. 20, 2014), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3133.pdf 
[https:/ /perma.cc/KB8A-G5SR]. 
262. ICSID Convention, supra note 72, art. 58. Article 58 of the ICSID Convention 
provides as follows: 
The decision on any proposal to disqualify a conciliator or arbitrator shall be 
taken by the other members of the Commission or Tribunal as the case may be, 
provided that where those members are equally divided, or in the case of a propo-
sal to disqualify a sole conciliator or arbitrator, or a majority of the conciliators or 
arbitrators, the Chairman shall take that decision. If it is decided that the propo-
sal is well-founded the conciliator or arbitrator to whom the decision relates shall 
be replaced in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of Chapter III or Sec-
tion 2 of Chapter IV. 
Id. 
263. See Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-E.U., art. 8.30.3,July 5, 
2016, COM(2016) 443 final [hereinafter CETAJ, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
resource.html?uri=cellar:lfcbd7dl-4356-lle6-9c64-0laa75ed7lal.0001.02/DOC_2&for 
mat=PDF [https:/ /perma.cc/PE67-9XH4] (has been formally proposed to the Council of 
Europe, and now awaits a confirmation, and signatures from EU Member states). Article 
8.30 of the CETA states the following: 
1. The Members of the Tribunal shall be independent. They shall not be affili-
ated with any government. They shall not take instructions from any organisa-
tion, or government with regard to matters related to the dispute. They shall not 
participate in the consideration of any disputes that would create a direct or indi-
rect conflict of interest. They shall comply with the International Bar Association 
Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration or any supplemen-
tal rules adopted pursuant to Article 8.44.2. In addition, upon appointment, they 
shall refrain from acting as counsel or as party-appointed expert or witness in any 
pending or new investment dispute under this or any other international 
agreement. 
2. If a disputing party considers that a Member of the Tribunal has a conflict of 
interest, it may invite the President of the International Court of Justice to issue a 
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C. Applicable Standard of Review 
Having determined that preference should be given to an exter-
nal or semi-external body, this Section explores the standard that 
international courts and tribunals should adopt and apply to the 
review of challenge requests. 
Across all courts and tribunals, the conditions to sit as a judge or 
arbitrator include the essential requirement that the adjudicator 
be impartial and independent.264 Requirements of independence 
and impartiality are found in both permanent courts like the ICJ 
and the ICC, as well as in the rules of international arbitral pro-
ceedings, including UNCITRAL and ICSID.265 These require-
ments are common for courts-such as the ICC, the IC1Y, and the 
ICTR~and ICSID tribunals that adjudicate inter-state claims, as 
well as claims brought against or by individuals.266 In fact, inde-
pendence and impartiality are at the very core of the judicial 
function. 267 
A judge or arbitrator is carefully vetted during the selection pro-
cess to ensure he or she possesses the qualities of independence 
and impartiality that are required.268 Then, once the selection 
occurs and the judge or arbitrator is appointed, there should be a 
presumption of impartiality that applies to the judicial function. 269 
decision on the challenge to the appointment of such Member. Any notice of 
challenge shall be sent to the President of the International Court of Justice 
within [fifteen] days of the date on which the composition of the division of the 
Tribunal has been communicated to the disputing party, or within [fifteen] days 
of the date on which the relevant facts came to its knowledge, if they could not 
have reasonably been known at the time of composition of the division. The 
notice of challenge shall state the grounds for the challenge. 
3. If, within [fifteen] days from the date of the notice of challenge, the chal-
lenged Member of the Tribunal has elected not to resign from the division, the 
·President of the International Court of Justice may, after receiving submissions 
from the disputing parties and after providing the Member of the Tribunal an 
opportunity to submit any observations, issue a decision on the challenge. The 
President of the International Court of Justice shall endeavor to issue the decision 
and to notify the disputing parties and the other Members of the division within 
[forty-five] days of receipt of the notice of challenge. A vacancy resulting from 
the disqualification or resignation of a Member of the Tribunal shall be filled 
promptly. 
Id. art. 8.30 (footnote omitted). 
264. See supra Section I.B. 
265. See id. 
266. See id. 
267. See supra Part I and Section III.A. 
268. On the selection of international judges, see Erik Voeten, The Politics of Interna-
tional Judicial Appointments, 9 Cm. J. INT'L L. 387, 390-98 (2009) (examining in detail the 
politics of the appointment process and how it shapes the composition of the international 
judiciary). 
269. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17 /l-A99, Judgment,~ 196. 
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In other words, challenging or trying to remove a selected arbitra-
tor or elected judge should not be easy and should require a high 
threshold of evidence, which requires a reasonable apprehension 
of bias. 
In Furundiija, the IC1Y made this principle very clear.27o Anton 
Furundzija was accused of committing torture and the crime of 
outrages against personal dignity, including rape, and he was on 
trial at the IClY.271 A challenge was brought against a female 
judge, Judge Mumba, who had, prior to joining the court, served 
on the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women.272 The defen-
dant in the proceedings had argued that past activities resulted in a 
bias in favor of women and against crimes committed against 
them.273 In reviewing and rejecting the challenge, the Appeals 
Chamber of the IC1Y observed that: 
[I]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, it must be assumed 
that the Judges of the International Tribunal "can disabuse their 
minds of any irrelevant personal beliefs or predispositions." It is 
for the Appellant to adduce sufficient evidence to satisfy the 
Appeals Chamber that Judge Mumba was not impartial in his 
case. There is a high threshold to reach in order to rebut the 
presumption of impartiality. 274 
Similarly, the ECHR also confirmed that "the personal impartiality 
of a judge must be presumed until there is proof to the contrary 
"275 
Hence, as a starting point, courts agree that a simple assertion by 
one of the parties that they believe the judge or arbitrator is not 
independent and impartial should not result in the removal of the 
adjudicator. Indeed, impartiality cannot be proven by a mere 
assertion of one of the parties, when the threshold of proof is high 
and a presumption of impartiality accompanies the adjudicator. In 
Dalalic, the IC1Y justified the high threshold required to challenge 
and concluded that: 
The reason for this high threshold is that, just as any real 
appearance of bias [on] the part of a judge undermines confi-
dence in the administration of justice, it would be as much of a 
270. See id. 1 197. 
271. See id. 1 5. 
272. Id. 1 164. 
273. See id. 1 206. 
274. Id. 1 197. 
275. Hauschildt v. Denmark, 154 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 47 (1989). The applicant 
filed a petition alleging that he did not receive a fair trial by an impartial tribunal under 
Article 6 of the Convention. See id. at 18. He asserted that some of the sitting judges who 
had convicted him had circulated numerous pretrial decisions concerning his case. See id. 
The court held that a violation of Article (6) had occurred. Id. at 23. 
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potential threat to the interests of the impartial and fair admin-
istration of justice if judges were to disqualify themselves on the 
basis of unfounded and unsupported allegations of apparent 
bias.276 
249 
How, then, should the impartiality of the adjudicator be assessed? 
Most international fora have adopted a "reasonable" apprehen-
sion or doubt standard, as assessed by a reasonable and informed 
third party. 277 It calls for the facts which are the basis of the chal-
lenge to raise justifiable doubts in a third party about the impartial-
ity and independence of an arbitrator.278 This is an objective 
standard that allows for an acceptable review of the evidence and 
that takes into consideration that challenges are serious issues that 
should be proven by a reasonable third party.279 In the words of 
the ICIY in Furundiija, "[D]isqualification is only made out by 
showing that there is a reasonable apprehension of bias by reason 
of prejudgment and this must be 'firmly established.' "280 
There may be a risk that the same "third-party justifiable doubts" 
standard would not be uniformly applied by different tribunals 
with jurisdiction over different issues,281 for example, that an ICIY 
judge may be required to use a different standard than an arbitra-
tor deciding on investment issues. That said, as demonstrated 
below, practice has shown remarkable commonalities amongst 
international courts and tribunals on the interpretation of stan-
dards of judicial behavior. One might nevertheless expect that cer-
tain differences would exist between different judicial bodies, as 
they often continue to exist in the jurisprudence of the same courts 
deciding cases based on unique facts. Finally, divergent applica-
tions of the same standard can still inform the interpretation of the 
276. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 'll 707 
(Int'! Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001). 
277. See generally Catherine A. Rogers, The Ethics of International Arbitrators, in THE LEAD-
ING ARBITRATORS' GUIDE To INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 621 (Lawrence w. Newman & 
Richard D. Hill eds., 2d ed. 2008) (providing an overview of the essential considerations 
for arbitrators and parties); CATHERINE A. ROGERS, ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
(2014) (addressing professional obligations of primary participants in international 
arbitration). 
278. See DAELE, supra note 13, at ll5. 
279. See Chiara Giorgetti, Towards A Revised Threshold for Arbitrators' Challenges Under 
ICSID?, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (July 3, 2014), http:/ /kluwerarbitrationblog.com/ 
2014/ 07 I 03 / towards-a-revised-threshold-for-arbitrators-challenges-under-icsid [h ttps:/ I 
perma.cc/6W37-BJ2X]; Giorgetti, supra note 87. 
280. Prosecutor v. Furund_ija, Case No. IT-95-17 /l-A99, Judgment, 'll 197 (quoting 
Mason], in ReJRL; Ex parte CJL (1986) 161CLR342, 352 (Aust!.)). 
281. See generally Catherine A. Rogers, The Politics of International Investment Arbitrators, 
12 SANTA CLARA]. INT'L L. 223 (2013) (discussing the issue of comparative statistics and 
baselines when comparing different tribunals). 
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standard vis-a-vis the principles of independence and impartiality, 
which are inherently undetermined.282 
The Appeals Chamber of the IC1Y confirmed the existence of a 
uniform approach in Furundiija where, after consulting the juris-
prudence of many other international courts, it found that there 
was a "general rule" that judges should not only be subjectively free 
from bias, but also that nothing in the surrounding circumstances 
should objectively give rise to "an appearance of bias."283 The 
Appeals Chamber then observed that the appearance of bias 
should be assessed by a reasonable observer and maintained that 
"the reasonable person must be an informed person, with knowl-
edge of all the relevant circumstances, including the traditions of 
integrity and impartiality that form a part of the background and 
apprised also of the fact that impartiality is one of the duties that 
rn udges swear to uphold. "284 
The ECHR also shares and applies a similar approach. In Haus-
childt v. Denmark, the ECHR addressed the question of impartiality 
of a judge in relation to Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, which guarantees a right to fair trial. 285 The court 
asserted that, quite apart from the personal conduct of the judge, 
to assess the existence of impartiality, it should determine whether 
there are ascertainable facts which may raise doubts as to a judge's 
impartiality286 from the prospective of a reasonable observer.287 
The ECHR found in favor of Mr. Hauschildt and concluded that in 
the circumstances of the case, the impartiality of the tribunals at 
issue were "capable of appearing to be open to doubt."288 The 
ECHR argued that "even appearances may be of a certain impor-
282. See generally RoGERS, supra note 277, ch. 7 (expounding on the principles of inde-
pendence and impartiality). 
283. Prosecutor v. Furund_ija, Case No. IT-95-17 /l-A99, Judgment, i 189. 
284. Id. i 190 (quoting R.D.S. v. The Queen (1997) 3 S.C.R. 484, 486 (Can.)). 
285. See Hauschildt v. Denmark, 154 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) i 1 (1989). Article 6, para-
graph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides the following: 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment 
shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all 
or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a 
democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the pri-
vate life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion 
of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the inter-
ests of justice. 
European Convention on Human Rights art. 6(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
286. Hauschildt v. Denmark, 154 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) i 48. 
287. See id. i 43. 
288. Id. i 52. 
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tance [,]" because what is at stake "is the confidence which the 
courts in a democratic society must inspire in the public."289 
Importantly, the same standard is also adopted in international 
arbitration under UNCITRAL Rules.290 Article 12(1) of the UNCI-
TRAL Rules provides that an arbitrator may be challenged "if cir-
cumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts" as to the 
"impartiality or independence" of the arbitrator.291 In applying 
this standard, arbitral tribunals constituted under those rules clari-
fied that "this is an objective standard in that it requires not only a 
showing of doubt, but doubt that is justifiable."292 Thus, for exam-
ple, in Vito Gallo v. Canada, the appointing authority decided that 
from the point of view of a "reasonable and informed third party" 
in the case, "there would be justifiable doubts" about the "imparti-
ality and independence" of the challenged arbitrator if he did not 
discontinue certain "advisory services" to potential intervener Mex-
ico for the remainder of the arbitration.293 
In sum, there is a general consensus amongst many international 
courts and .tribunals that the appropriate standard to use is the rea-
sonable, third-party standard. This standard is adopted by fora that 
decide on a variety of issues, including individual criminal respon-
sibility, human rights violations, and investment issues. 
However, the standard is not unanimously adopted. Until 
recently, ICSID tribunals, for example, were unique in adopting a 
much different and narrowly read standard under Article 57 of the 
ICSID Convention, which allowed for the removal of an arbitrator 
only upon proof of a "manifest" lack of the qualities required to sit 
as an arbitrator.294 The standard allowed for the acceptance of a 
challenge only if the challenged arbitrator manifestly lacked the 
qualities required to sit as an arbitrator, and ICSID interpreted the 
word "manifest" as equivalent to "obvious" or "evident."295 The 
application of the "manifest standard" had been rightly criticized 
289. Id. , 48. 
290. See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 59, art. 12(1). 
291. Id. 
292. Gallo v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 55798, Decision on 
the Challenge to Mr.J. Christopher Thomas, QC,, 19 (Oct. 14, 2009); Grand River Enter-
prises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Decision on the 
Challenge to Arbitrator James Anaya, 2 (Nov. 28, 2007), http://www.italaw.com/sites/ 
default/files/ case-documents/ita0382_0.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/7YNE-QDNP]. 
293. Gallo v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 55798, Decision on 
the Challenge to Mr. J. Christoph~r Thomas, QC , 36. 
294. See ICSID Convention, supra note 72, arts. 14, 57. 
295. See Baiju S. Vasani & Shaun A. Palmer, Challenge and Disqualification of Arbitrators at 
ICSID: A New Dawn?, 30 ICSID REv. 194, 199-201 (2015). 
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as excessively difficult to prove and too protective of the arbitra-
tor. 295 Indeed, as seen above, the presumption of impartiality as 
explained in Furundiija already provides sufficient protection to 
the challenged arbitrator. 297 
More recently, though, in Blue Bank v. Venezuela, the chairman of 
the ICSID Administrative Council altered the interpretation of the 
manifest standard.298 In the case, Venezuela had challenged a 
claimant-appointed arbitrator, alleging that the international law 
firm at which he was a partner represented a client against Vene-
zuela in another case, albeit in a different office.299 The chairman 
applied "an objective standard based on a reasonable evaluation of 
the evidence by a third party" and interpreted the word "manifest" 
in the ICSID Convention "as meaning 'evident' and 'obvious' and 
relating to the ease with which the alleged lack of qualities can be 
perceived."300 Hence, the chairman upheld the challenge while 
staying within the boundaries set in Article 57 of the ICSID Con-
vention. 301 Shortly thereafter, the chairman used the same stan-
dard of assessment to decide another challenge in Burlington v. 
Ecuador. 302 This development is welcomed and hopefully demon-
strates a change of course in challenges decided under the ICSID 
Convention. 
One outlier remains-the ICJ. Differently from all other courts, 
neither the applicable rules nor the jurisprudence of the ICJ have 
resulted in the development of a standard of review to challenges 
296. See Charles B. Rosenberg, To Use a Cannon to Kill a Mosquito: Why the Increase in 
Arbitrator Challenges in Investment Arbitration Does Not Warrant a Complete Overhaul of the System, 
in 8 INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 19 (Ian A Laird, Borzu 
Sabahi, Frederic G. Sourgens & Todd]. Weiler eds., 2015). 
297. Prosecutorv. Furund_ija, Case No. IT-95-17/l-A99,Judgment, H 196-97. 
298. Blue Bank Int'! & Trust (Barbados) Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/12/20, Decision on the Parties' Proposals to Disqualify a Majority of 
the Tribunal, H 59-62 (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw3009.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/DT7Y-VQ43]. In the case, the respondent 
had challenged the arbitrator appointed by claimant because of his partnership in the 
Madrid office of Baker & McKenzie. Id. ii 23. At the time, Baker & McKenzie also repre-
sented claimant in another case against Venezuela through its offices in New York and 
Caracas. Id. ii 22. 
299. Id. H 22-26. 
300. Id. iii! 60-61 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Suez, Sociedad General 
de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Cases No. ARB/03/19, Decision 
on the Proposal for the Disqualification of a Member of the Arbitral Tribunal, ii 39 (Oct. 
22, 2007)). 
301. Id. ii 71. 
302. Burlington Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, 
Decision on the Proposal for Disqualification of Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuna, ii 68 
(Dec. 13, 2013). 
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there. In the only publicly available opinion on this issue, the 
court rejected a request for removal of one judge without giving 
any specifics of the adopted standard.303 In the case, Legal Conse-
quence of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Pal,estinian Terri-
tory, the U.N. General Assembly asked the court to determine the 
legality of Israel's construction of a partition wall in the occupied 
Palestinian territory.304 During the proceeding, Israel requested 
the president of the court to remove the Egyptian judge, Nabil 
Elaraby, a former senior diplomat for Egypt. Israel raised three 
issues.305 
First, it claimed that Judge Elaraby should be recused because of 
his active official and public roles as an Egyptian diplomat.306 The 
court rejected this claim and noted that Judge Elaraby had acted as 
the legal adviser to the Egyptian government, which had occurred 
many years before the issue of the construction of the wall arose.307 
Second, Israel claimed that Judge Elaraby had been involved in 
decisions at the General Assembly that were relevant for the 
case.308 The ICJ again dismissed the claim and concluded that the 
questions submitted to the court were not discussed until after 
Judge Elaraby had participated in them.309 Third, Israel com-
plained that in an interview prior to his election to the court, Judge 
Elaraby had made statements that could suggest a prejudgment of 
some of the issues in the case.310 The court again dismissed the 
claim and concluded that Judge Elaraby's comments had 
"expressed no opinion on the question put in the present case."311 
Israel's request was rejected thirteen to one-as is customary, 
Judge Elaraby did not participate in the vote-and the court con-
cluded that Judge Elaraby had not previously taken part in the 
case, as required for a finding of relative incompatibility by Article 
17 (2) of the ICJ Statute. 312 Interestingly, Judge Buergenthal dis-
303. In the opinion, Israel sent a confidential letter to the ICJ president to bring to his 
attention certain facts it considered possibly relevant to the participation of Judge Elaraby 
in the case. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Order, 2004 I.CJ. 3, U 3-5 (Jan. 30). 
304: See id.; see also supra Section II.B.l. 
305. Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, 2004 I.CJ. 3, U 2-5 (Jan. 30). 
306. Id. U 2-3. 
307. Id. 'lI 8. 
308. Id. 'l[ 4. 
309. Id. 'l[ 8. 
310. Id. 'l[ 4. 
311. Id. 'l[ 8. 
312. Id. 'lI 7. 
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sented on the last point and asserted that although the "formalistic 
and narrow" construction of Article 17 (2) had not been violated, 
his concern was that the interview created "an appearance of bias" 
that required the court to preclude Judge Elaraby's participation in 
the proceedings. 313 
Regardless of the outcome in any specific case, it would be pref-
erable for the ICJ to adopt a clear standard of review that is in line 
with other international courts and tribunals, and namely that 
applies a more explicit "appearance-of-bias" test, as assessed by a 
reasonable third party.314 As demonstrated above, there is a con-
sensus among essentially all international courts and tribunals that 
a standard requiring a reasonable doubt, as assessed by a third 
party, is an acceptable and correct standard to be used in challenge 
procedures in international courts and tribunals. While challenges 
at the ICJ remain rare occurrences, if the court is faced by one 
such case it would benefit the standing and legitimacy of the court 
to issue a reasoned opinion based on a clearly articulated standard. 
Indeed, while an analysis of the factual circumstances surrounding 
the case should take priority, assessing those facts under a reasona-
ble standard would also facilitate an analysis of the decision. 
International courts and tribunals are tasked to do much more 
today, and their decisions affect an ever-increasing number of peo-
ple. Adopting a reasonable third-party standard would strengthen 
a decision by the court and allow it to be rooted within an existing 
theoretical framework. Doing so would also facilitate an under-
standing of the applicable rules and would be especially important 
to strengthen the sociological legitimacy of the court. Moreover, as 
the jurisprudence of ICSID analyzed above demonstrates, this step 
would not necessarily require a change of the rules, but rather 
could be accomplished with a novel reading of the existing applica-
ble procedural rules. 
CONCLUSION 
The analysis in this Article confirms a certain degree of uniform-
ity among challenge procedures, but also identifies several anoma-
lies pertaining to who decides the challenge and the standard to be 
313. See id. 'II 13 (Buergenthal, J., dissenting); see also supra Section 11.B.l. 
314. See generally Dame Rosalyn Higgins, What International Courts (and judges) May and 
May Not Do, U.N. ComFICATION DIVISION, LEGAL AFFAIRS, http:/ /legal.un.org/avl/ls/Hig-
gins_CT_video_l.html [https://perma.cc/63BB-ALRA] (last visited Oct. 21, 2016) 
(explaining that each court has various rules and case law but that there should still be 
standards as to what courts and judges may and may not do). 
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adopted. It concludes that a best practice has developed, which 
calls for challenge decisions made by an external or semi-external 
body using a justifiable standard as assessed by a reasonable third 
party.31s 
Robust challenge and recusal procedures for judges and arbitra-
tors in international courts and tribunals are fundamental to guar-
antee the legitimacy and effectiveness of international courts and 
tribunals. Continuing changes in this direction will also ensure 
that judges and arbitrators are and continue to be seen as indepen-
dent adjudicators. 
315. See Mackenzie & Sands, supra note 9, at 285 (" [W] e suggest that it is both possible 
and desirable to identify certain common core guidelines for judicial independence appli-
cable to all international judges, regardless of the tribunal on which they sit. Indeed close 
scrutiny of existing relevant rules, guidelines, and practices may reveal that agreement on 
these core criteria already exists."). 
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APPENDIX 1: SUMMARY OF CHALLENGE PROCEDURES 
Court or To Whom to File the When to Who Decides Reasons for Proposal 
Tribunal Reauest Submit 
ICJ To the president of the No deadline Members of ICJ Statute Articles 16 
ICJ confidentially in the court and 17: Judges exercising 
writing; the president can political or administrative 
also act sua sponte if function, or acting as 
there is some special agent, counsel or 
reason;316 the judge can advocate in any case 
also recuse him/herself (only (or elected 
members of the court), 
past participation in a 
case as agent, counsel, or 
advocate for one of the 
parties, or as a member 
of a national or 
international court, or 
commission of enquiry, 
or in any other capacity 
(both for elected and ad 
hoc iud12:es\ 
ICSID To the secretary general "Promptly" The ICSID Convention Article 
and in any remaining 57: On account of any 
case before members of fact indicating a manifest 
the the tribunal lack of the qualities 
proceeding if only one required to be 
is declared arbitrator is nominated 
closed challenged; 
the chairman 
of the 
Administrative 
Council if 
the 
remaining 
members are 
equally 
divided or if 
the proposal 
refers to the 
majority or 
sole 
arbitrator 
UNCITRAL Directly to the other Fifteen days If, within UNCITRAL Rules 
party, the arbitrator who after the fifteen days (2010), Article 12(1): 
is challenged, and to the party has from the Any arbitrator may be 
other arbitrators been date of the challenged if 
notified of notice, the circumstances exist that 
the parties have give rise to justifiable 
appointment not agreed doubts as to the 
of the on the arbitrator's impartiality 
arbitrator or challenge or or independence. 
within the 
fifteen days challenged 
after arbitrator has 
learning of not 
the withdrawn, 
circumstances the oartv 
316. ICJ Statute, supra note 36, art. 24. 
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giving rise making the 
to the challenge 
challenge may pursue 
the challenge 
by seeking, 
within thirty 
days from 
the date of 
the challenge 
notice, a 
decision on 
the challenge 
from the 
appointing 
authoritv. 
ICC Rule 34(2): "Made in As soon as The absolute ICC Statute Article 41: 
writing as soon as there there is majority of lJudges should not 
is knowledge of the knowledge the judges participate in any case in 
grounds on which it is of the which his or her 
based. The request shall grounds on impartiality might be 
state the grounds and which the reasonably be doubted 
attach any relevant challenge is on any ground. Rule 34 
evidence, and shall be based grounds include 
transmitted to the person "personal interest in the 
concerned, who shall be case, including any 
entitled to present person or professional 
written submissions." relationship with any 
other parties, 
involvement in his/her 
private capacity in any 
legal proceedings 
involving the accused, 
performance of functions 
prior to taking office 
during which he/she 
could be expected to 
have formed an opinion 
on the case in question 
on the parties or their 
legal representatives that 
'objectively, could 
adversely affect the 
required impartiality of 
the person concentered' 
and expression of 
opinions 'through the 
communication of media, 
in writing or in public 
actions, that objectively, 
could adversely affect the 
required impartiality of 
the nerson concerned."' 
ICTY To the presiding judge Not The IC1Y Statute Rule 15(B): 
of the chamber specified presiding If necessary, following 
judge first the report of the 
confers with presiding judge, the 
the judge in president may appoint a 
question. If panel of three judges 
necessary, from other chambers to 
following the report to him its decision 
reoort of the on the merits of the 
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presiding application. A judge may 
. judge, the not sit at a trial or appeal 
president in any case in which he 
may appoint has a personal interest or 
a panel of concerning which he has 
three judges or has had any 
from other association which might 
chambers to affect his impartiality. 
report to him 
its decision 
on the merits 
of the 
aoolication. 
ICTR To the presiding judge Not The ICTR Statute Rule 15: A 
of the chamber specified presiding judge may not sit at a 
judge first trial or appeal in any 
confers with case in which he has a 
the judge in personal interest or 
question. concerning which he has 
The Bureau or has had any 
(composed association which might 
of the affect his impartiality. 
president, 
the vice-
president 
and the 
presiding 
judge of the 
Trial 
Chambers) if 
necessary, 
shall 
determine 
the matter. 
